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1.

INTRODUCTION

This Article makes two novel claims, one normative and one
descriptive.
The normative claim is that the international
community should recognize as new states entities claiming
independence from their parent states if doing so would serve as
an effective sanction for human rights abuses committed by the
parent state, even if there is no connection between the secessionist
entity and the bad behavior of the parent state (“the sanction
theory of recognition”).
The descriptive claim is that the
international community’s recognition decisions, while not
expressed in terms of the sanction theory of recognition, are
becoming increasingly driven by it.
Secession, recognition, and the creation of new states is an issue
of enormous practical significance; in addition to the almost 150
states that came into existence in the twentieth century, numerous
entities and movements seek independence today.1 While some
movements can be dismissed as fantastic, like the current
movement for an independent Vermont and similar movements in
other states,2 many secessionist entities, like Chechnya, Darfur,
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1 See Bruno Coppieters, Introduction, in CONTEXTUALIZING SECESSION:
NORMATIVE STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1, 1 (Bruno Coppieters & Richard
Sakwa eds., 2003) (discussing modern secession crises).
2 See Ian Baldwin & Frank Bryan, The Once and Future Republic of Vermont,
WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2007, at B1. (discussing the movement for Vermont’s
independence and noting that similar movements exist in Alaska, California,
Hawaii, New Hampshire, South Carolina, Texas, and other states).
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Tibet, Kosovo, Taiwan, Somaliland, and others present extremely
difficult situations and complex theoretical and practical questions.
A secessionist entity’s quest for independence, of course, concerns
not only the secessionist entity itself, but also the parent state from
which it seeks independence:
if the secessionist entity is
successful, the parent state suffers a blow to its territorial integrity
and loses control over the entity’s territory, population, and
resources. The question of secession is a high-stakes contest in
which there are winners and losers. And as with any such contest,
determining who wins and who loses will rarely be a simple task.
Much of that complicated determination, declaring either the
secessionist entity or its parent state the winner or the loser, falls to
other states in the international community. For secessionist
entities to become full-fledged states with all the accordant
benefits, they must be recognized as states for one of two reasons:
either because recognition is an essential precondition for
statehood or, more practically, because it is only with recognition
that new states actually realize the benefits of statehood. Under
international law, other states decide whether or not to recognize
secessionist entities as new states. The question, then, is: how
should states decide whether or not to recognize a secessionist
entity as a new state?
Traditional answers to this question have focused on the
intrinsic merits of the secessionist entity. The simplest answers
specify certain requirements of statehood, and suggest that
recognition should be granted to all secessionist entities that meet
those requirements. Others have supplemented the requirements
of statehood with additional requirements, usually related to some
international ideological norm: that is, secessionist entities should
be recognized as states if they meet the requirements of statehood
and have democratic institutions, or promote self-determination, or
do not have illegal origins, or meet some other criterion.
These proposals are flawed for two primary reasons, both
caused by their inattention to the parent states implicated in
recognition decisions. First, they fail to take account of the
interests of the parent state, which has an enormous stake in
whether or not the secessionist entity is recognized as a new state
and thereby removed from the parent state’s control. These
theories do not provide sufficient justification for the violation of
the parent state’s territorial integrity that is inherent in recognizing
the secessionist entity as a new state. Similarly, because parent
states are so interested in the outcome of recognition decisions, the
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international community’s strategy for recognition decisions can be
used to influence the behavior of states. These theories, by
ignoring the parent state, squander a vital opportunity for the
international community.
Focusing on human rights abuses committed by the parent
state takes advantage of this opportunity for influence while also
providing a justification for damaging the interests of the parent
state. While the international community has many interests it
might like to advance through its recognition decisions, focusing
on human rights abuses has much to recommend it. Certainly,
deterring human rights abuses qualifies as an important interest of
the international community; and the international community has
very few tools to use in its efforts to deter such abuses. Critically,
while other interests might also be worth promoting, focusing on
the human rights abuses of the parent state provides the
international community with a justification for damaging the
interests of the parent state and violating its territorial integrity
through recognition of a secessionist entity within its borders: the
international community is not just advancing its own selfish
interests at the expense of the parent state, but the parent state,
through its criminal acts, has forfeited its right to respect for its
interests, including its territorial integrity.
Picking up on these notions, “just cause” and “just cause plus”
theories of recognition merge the question of human rights into the
intrinsic merits of the secessionist entity: they require that a
secessionist entity have suffered human rights abuses at the hands
of its parent state before a secessionist entity can be recognized as a
new state. While these theories of recognition deter certain human
rights abuses and provide a justification for damaging the interests
of the parent state, they are inherently limited because they
approach recognition as a question of the intrinsic merits of the
secessionist entity, and thus require a nexus between the human
rights abuses of the parent state and the secessionist entity.
The sanction theory of recognition removes this nexus
requirement, and shifts the approach to recognition from an
evaluation of the intrinsic merits of the secessionist entity, the
focus of other theories of recognition, to a consideration of extrinsic
concerns: it uses recognition as a tool to deter human rights abuses
generally. Simply put, the sanction theory advocates recognition
for secessionist entities when granting them recognition would
serve as an effective sanction for human rights abuses committed
by the parent state, whether or not those abuses are in any way
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related to the secessionist entity, and so long as recognizing the
secessionist entity will not make the world worse off. The sanction
theory of recognition thus realizes the full potential of recognition
decisions for the international community: it transforms them into
a tool for combating human rights abuses, regardless of whether
the abuses are committed against secessionist entities or not.
This is not to say that, at times, states cannot recognize
secessionist entities based on some analysis of their intrinsic merits.
The sanction theory simply argues that when a parent state is
committing human rights abuses somewhere in its territory, and
recognizing a secessionist entity within that parent state would
serve as an effective sanction for that behavior, while not making
the world worse off, the extrinsic concerns of stopping such
behavior override any intrinsic concerns that might be taken into
account in other situations.
Importantly, because the sanction theory grounds recognition
decisions in human rights abuses by the parent state, and because
international law has accepted that states have enormous
discretion in their recognition decisions, the sanction theory of
recognition fits reasonably well within the confines of existing
international law and practice. Furthermore, recent recognition
decisions by the international community seem to be driven, at
least in part, by the same considerations that underlie the sanction
theory of recognition.
Section 2 of this paper outlines the “just cause” and “just cause
plus” theories of recognition and the sanction theory of recognition
in greater depth, to make the contours of the sanction theory
evident and illustrate the great distance between it and these
previously proposed theories. Section 3 continues to explore the
sanction theory by outlining its place within the context of current
law, thinking, and practice on statehood and recognition. Section 4
analyzes the cases of Kosovo, Somaliland, and Chechnya, arguing
that the recognition decisions in those cases can best be explained
by the intuitive, if unstated and perhaps unconscious, application
of the sanction theory by the international community.
2.

RECOGNITION AS RIGHT; RECOGNITION AS SANCTION

“Just cause” theories, popularized by Allen Buchanan, are not
necessarily theories of recognition; they arise in the context of the
right to secede, and suggest that an entity has a right to make a
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secessionist attempt if it has “just cause.”3 Under these theories, a
secessionist entity, as “a remedy of last resort,” has a right to
secede “[i]f the [parent] state persists in certain serious injustices
toward” the secessionist entity.4 If we assume that a state with a
just cause to secede has a right to be recognized, we are left with a
theory that recommends recognition for any secessionist entity that
has suffered sufficient and continuing abuse at the hands of its
parent state.5
Theories, of course, may reject this assumption, and argue that
even if an entity has a right to secede, it may not have a right to
recognition, a position Buchanan, himself, adopts.6 Buchanan’s
theory of recognition builds upon the just cause theory, requiring
entities not only to have a just cause for secession but also to meet
other criteria in order to be recognized, a “just cause plus” theory.
While Buchanan thinks that an entity has a right to attempt to
secede if it has a just cause, a just cause “by itself does not imply
that the new entity ought to be recognized as a legitimate state in
international law.”7
Specifically, Buchanan asserts that
recognition:
should depend upon whether the group provides credible
commitments to satisfying the appropriate normative
criteria for recognition of new entities as legitimate states,
in particular whether its constitution and other relevant
documents . . . evidence a clear commitment to equal rights
for all within their borders, including ethno-national
minorities.8
That is, secessionist entities that have a just cause to secede,
based on bad acts by their parent state, and that also “make
credible commitments to internal and external justice” should be
recognized.9 Similarly, NedZad Basic has argued:

3 ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL
FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 207 (2003).
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 208.
9 Id. at 244.
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The international community will assess the policies and
actions of [the parent state and the secessionist entity]
against their respect for human rights. It will allow
secession if the central government fails to respect human
rights, peace, and development [within the secessionist
entity]. Similarly, the group seeking self-determination
must not use force and must not violate human rights;
otherwise, the international community will respect the
state’s territorial integrity against the group’s desire to
secede. Assessment against a human rights standard
produces competition between the parties to outperform
the other.10
For Basic, recognition decisions should hinge on the parent
state and the secessionist entity’s behavior during the conflict
between the two.
While these theories relate the recognition decision in some
way to the behavior of the parent state, they, like all other
previously proposed theories of recognition, keep their focus on
the secessionist entity. Both are framed in “rights talk”: under
“just cause” theories, secessionist entities have a right to be
recognized because they have been abused, while under “just
cause plus” theories, secessionist entities have a right to be
recognized because, in addition to being abused, they are
committed to being “good” states. Unlike previously proposed
theories of recognition, the sanction theory of recognition
abandons this “rights talk” and conceptualizes recognition as one
tool in the international community’s toolbox for stopping
international crime, specifically the abuse of human rights, as a
measure of last resort when other tools, like economic and political
sanctions, fail.
The essential theoretical notion behind the proposal of the
sanction theory is to shift the focus of the recognition decision from
the entity claiming independence to the state from which
independence is sought. The sanction theory thus comports more
with the reality of the situation: the parent state is at least as
affected by the recognition decision as the secessionist entity is,
given that the parent state loses a significant portion of its
resources, population, and territory if recognition is granted. The
10 NedZad Basic, International Law and Security Dilemmas in Multiethnic States,
8 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 32 (2002).
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sanction theory also greatly increases the mechanisms available to
the international community to enforce human rights norms; by
transforming recognition decisions into a means to stop human
rights abuses, it captures significant utility that current theories
waste.
Under the sanction theory of recognition, recognition decisions
are used as sanctions. The shift in focus is somewhat akin to a
similar shift in focus that has occurred in criminal sentencing law,
at least in the United States. While sentencing law has remained
focused on the offender, theories of sentencing have shifted from a
notion that the sentence should serve to rehabilitate the offender to
sentences designed to accomplish primarily four purposes:
punishing an offender for his crime, deterring the offender from
committing future crimes (specific deterrence), deterring others
from committing crimes (general deterrence), and incapacitating
the offender through incarceration, thereby preventing the
offender from committing other crimes.11 Under the sanction
theory of recognition, recognition decisions are understood as a
tool to promote these same ends, replacing everyday criminals
with criminal states and everyday crimes with human rights abuse;
that is, recognition decisions should be made based on signaling
the international community’s moral outrage at the parent state’s
human rights abuses, deterring the parent state from committing
human rights abuses, deterring all states from committing such
abuses for fear that they, too, will have a secessionist movement
recognized within their territory, and physically disabling the
parent state from committing human rights abuses at least within
the area of a secessionist entity, by removing the entity from the
control of the parent state. As sanctions in the international
community are primarily justified by their ability to make the
international community a better place, with fewer human rights
abuses, the most important of these goals is deterrence in the
general sense. Thus under the sanction theory of recognition, a
new entity should be recognized as a state when recognition would
serve to fulfill these purposes, particularly general deterrence, and
need not be recognized as a state when recognition would not do
so.
11 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A
Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts about the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 9–11 (2003) (describing the shift in purposes in the United States); 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(2) (1985) (laying out the purposes of U.S. sentencing law).
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Recognition of secessionist entities has the potential to be a
sanction against the parent state because it is bad for the parent
state: not only are sanctions qua sanctions bad for the parent state
because they hurt the state’s international reputation by signaling
that the state has been judged by the international community to
be a bad actor, but the sanction is also (and primarily) bad for the
parent state for very practical reasons: the parent state is losing its
legal control over the territory of the newly recognized state, and
the people and resources it encompasses. Because recognition of a
secessionist entity is bad for the parent state, a rational government
in charge of the state will seek to avoid it; the state should be
willing to change its behavior in the face of a plausible threat of
recognition. Thus, recognition is theoretically suitable for use as a
sanction.
Furthermore, the simple act of recognition is costless, requiring
nothing more from the recognizing state than a statement. Of
course, to achieve fully the removal of the secessionist entity from
the parent state’s control, other sanctions and potentially armed
intervention may be necessary. But recognizing the secessionist
entity has power of its own: empirical evidence suggests that
recognition fortifies “the security of a community,” and thus is
independently helpful in removing the territory from the control of
the parent state.12 For instance, the security of the former Yugoslav
republics of Slovenia and Croatia were significantly increased
through recognition.13 Recognition can give the secessionist entity
numerous benefits that increase its chance of survival, and thus the
effective loss of the territory for the parent state. These benefits
include “greater ability to provide for the welfare of the
population . . . ; a reduction of the risk of external intervention; the
possibility of entering into treaty relationships with other states;
more settled borders; expanded opportunities for trade; enhanced
domestic legitimacy; . . . and other benefits.”14 The bare act of
recognition seems to help the secessionist entity actually free itself

12 THOMAS D. GRANT, THE RECOGNITION OF STATES: LAW AND PRACTICE IN
DEBATE AND EVOLUTION 27 (1999) (“Empirical evidence has been adduced which
suggests unrecognized entities lie in greater jeopardy of extinguishment than fullfledged states.”).
13 Id. at 29.
14 Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Statehood and the Third Geneva Convention,
46 VA. J. INT’L L. 131, 158 (2005). See also Coppieters, supra note 1, at 17 (discussing
the benefits of recognition).
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from the parent state, and thus remove territory, people, and
resources from the parent state.15
In a somewhat circular fashion, recognition also changes the
legal framework of the interactions between the parent state, the
secessionist entity, and other states. It enables the secessionist
entity to seek the benefits of the international system, including
military and economic aid. Recognition allows the new state to
seek admission into the United Nations16 and to secure aid from
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.17 Support
from these institutions, achieved only after recognition,
undoubtedly aids the continued existence and security of the new
state, and secures its removal from the control of the parent state.
Finally, recognition as a new state frees other states in the
international community to send military assistance to secure the
newfound territorial integrity of the recognized state. Even if
military assistance is not actually sent, recognition makes it easier
for the international community to threaten such action, making it
more likely that the parent state will not resist the newly
recognized state’s independence. Given the potential negative
consequences of recognition for the parent state, it can serve
effectively as a sanction for the parent state’s bad behavior.
As a theory of sanction and deterrence, the sanction theory
focuses predominantly on the parent state: primarily, whether the
parent state should be sanctioned and secondarily, whether such
sanctions would be efficacious.
A parent state should be
sanctioned if its behavior is the type of behavior that the
international community wants to deter, and if the imposition of
the sanction will effectively signal that such behavior will be
followed with a similar sanction in the future. As the typical target
for international sanctions, and the type of behavior the
international community most wants to deter, human rights abuses
are the target of the sanction theory. When the abuses are
sufficiently grave, recognition of a secessionist entity should be
threatened to deter the parent state’s continuation of its human

15 ALEKSANDAR PAVKOVIC & PETER
AND PRACTICE OF SECESSION 11 (2007).

RADAN, CREATING NEW STATES: THEORY

Id.
See About the IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/about.htm (last visited
Dec. 1, 2009) (describing its members as “countries”); About Us: Member
Countries, http://go.worldbank.org/F3SMXIS5K0 (last visited Dec. 1, 2009)
(describing its members as “countries”).
16
17
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rights abuses and, failing that, recognition should be granted to
deter the parent state and other states from committing similar
abuses in the future.
By shifting the focus of the recognition decision from the
secessionist entity to the parent state, from “rights talk” to
sanctions, the sanction theory eliminates any requirement of a
nexus between the secessionist entity and the bad behavior of the
parent state, a requirement inherent in “just cause” and “just cause
plus” theories. Under the sanction theory, the parent state need
only engage in the type of behavior that the international
community wants to deter; the behavior need not be related to the
secessionist entity. This critical difference between the sanction
theory and other theories of recognition can be seen by comparing
two hypothetical situations: suppose secessionist entity B desires
independence from parent state A. If A is abusing human rights in
B, a “just cause” theory will generally recommend recognition of B;
similarly, the sanction theory will also recommend recognition of B
if doing so would serve as an effective sanction against A. But
suppose A is not abusing human rights in B, but is instead abusing
the human rights of a religious group, C, that is widely dispersed
throughout the territory of A, or even concentrated in some other
part of A, completely separate from B. “Just cause” theories of
recognition will not recommend recognition for B; B has not earned
a right to secede or to be recognized. But as long as threatening
recognition of B will deter A from abusing the human rights of C,
or would deter other states in similar situations from abusing the
rights of groups in their states, the sanction theory of recognition
would recommend threatening recognition of B and eventually
recognizing B if A fails to improve its behavior.
To take a more concrete example, consider the situation in
Sudan. The government in Khartoum has committed serious
human rights abuses against the people of the Darfur region.18
Simultaneously, Southern Sudan, governed by the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement, has at times expressed a desire to become an
independent country.19 While Sudan has certainly violated human
18 See
Q&A: Sudan’s Darfur Conflict, BBC NEWS, Aug. 27, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3496731.stm (noting that over 2.7 million
Darfur civilians have fled to camps where they are subject to rape and murder by
patrolling Janjaweed militia).
19 See Glenn Kessler, Sudan’s Peace Deal, Seen as a Bush Success, is Endangered,
WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2007, at A18 (reporting that an administration official
acknowledged that Southern Sudan is moving towards independence).
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rights in Southern Sudan in the recent past,20 and while its current
treatment of Southern Sudan should not be taken as a model for
good governance,21 Sudan’s current treatment of Southern Sudan
would likely not be considered sufficiently abusive to justify
recognition under “just cause” theories. Under “just cause”
theories, the only recognition-related concern for Sudan in regards
to its treatment of Darfur is recognition of Darfur, itself. This may
be complicated by the specific facts of the situation, or, under “just
cause plus” theories, by the behavior of Darfur itself. The sanction
theory of recognition, however, would allow the international
community to threaten to, and eventually recognize, Southern
Sudan if Sudan did not reform its behavior in Darfur. Recognition,
when approached according to the sanction theory, thus provides
the international community with a tool to combat human rights
abuses that is unavailable under other recognition theories.
Even assuming that the international community could
recognize Darfur under the “just cause” and “just cause plus”
theories, by eliminating the nexus requirement, the sanction theory
would allow the international community more flexibility and a
more powerful tool to combat Sudan’s behavior. On a basic level,
recognition of Southern Sudan might be more practical, as
independence might be more effectively achieved for Southern
Sudan than for Darfur. Further, recognition of Southern Sudan
might be a better deterrent to Sudan’s behavior in Darfur than the
recognition of Darfur, itself; given the resource wealth in Southern
Sudan, there is good reason to believe this is the case.22 Finally, the
power and effect of the sanction could be ratcheted up under the
sanction theory: the international community could threaten to
and eventually recognize first one and then the other secessionist
entity within Sudan, providing an even more powerful incentive
for Sudan to reform its bad behavior.
Because there is no requirement of a nexus between the bad
behavior of the parent state and the secessionist entity, the sanction
20 See Human Rights Watch, Sudan: Oil Companies Complicit in Rights Abuses,
Nov. 24, 2003, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/11/25/sudan6528.htm
(reporting the Sudanese government’s use of looting, murder, and relief
prevention to drive thousands of farmers from oil-rich lands in Southern Sudan).
21 See Kessler, supra note 19 (discussing the potential erosion of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement as the Khartoum government has exhibited
increasing unwillingness to abide by its terms).
22 See id. (examining the tension over sharing oil wealth and the conflict
between the north and south over Abyei, a region with a large oil field).
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theory deters all manner of human rights abuses, and not simply
those committed against secessionist entities.
This allows
recognition to be a more useful sanction. If a nexus is required,
while states may be deterred from committing human rights
abuses against secessionist entities, they will still be capable of
abusing with impunity the human rights of the general population,
of a widely dispersed minority group, or of a particular region’s
population if, for some reason, that group is not a viable or
acceptable candidate for recognition. With the nexus requirement
eliminated, as long as a viable and acceptable secessionist entity
exists within the parent state, the threat of recognition of that
secessionist entity can serve to deter the parent state from abusing
the human rights of any group throughout its territory.
Of course, in practice there will likely be significant overlap
between the secessionist entity seeking recognition and the human
rights abuses of the parent state. It is unsurprising that human
rights violations against a particular group would lead to that
group forming a secessionist movement; or that, faced with the
threat of a secessionist movement, the parent state might respond
in a fashion that violates the secessionist group’s human rights.
Since human rights violations will often be tied to secessionist
movements on their own, the sanction theory of recognition will
frequently involve recognition of the very secessionist entity that
has been the subject of the human rights abuse; but under the
sanction theory, this need not be the case.
There are added benefits to having the subject of recognition be
a secessionist entity in which the human rights abuse has occurred.
If the abuse has occurred within the secessionist entity, then the
recognition and separation of the secessionist entity can serve to
physically block the parent state from continuing its abuse by
removing the secessionist entity from its control, much like the
sentencing goal of incapacitation.23 This, however, is merely an
additional consideration to be taken into account when making
recognition decisions, and need not be present. It will often be
outweighed by the other, more primary goals of the sanction,
general and specific deterrence. For instance, in the case of Sudan,
23 See Alschuler, supra note 11, at 11 (discussing the popular concept of
“selective incapacitation,” which provides for long-term confinement of those
believed to be responsible for a disproportionate share of crime); 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(2)(C) (1985) (listing “protect[ion of] the public from further crimes of the
defendant” as a central purpose of U.S. sentencing law).
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threatening to and recognizing Southern Sudan may be a better
sanction than threatening to and recognizing Darfur. The chance
that Darfur can be removed from the control of Sudan may be
outweighed by the greater deterrence that the loss of the territory
and natural resources of Southern Sudan would provide.
In certain circumstances, however, a sanction of recognition
would be ineffective, and therefore inappropriate, despite the bad
behavior of a parent state and the presence of a viable and
acceptable secessionist entity. This may occur either because the
parent state cannot be deterred or because the international
community will not perceive the sanction as generally applicable.
Even if specific and general deterrence do not justify the sanction,
other considerations may, such as the punitive expression of moral
outrage or the incapacitation of the parent state in regards to the
secessionist entity. These considerations may also fail in certain
circumstances, such as where the international community and the
secessionist entity will be unable to contain the parent state. In
cases where the recognition decision would not fulfill its purposes
or where the results of the recognition decision would be, on the
whole, worse for the international community, recognition, like
other sanctions, would be inappropriate.24
For instance, if the parent state is extremely strong and
militarily aggressive in general, it is possible that recognizing the
secessionist entity will have no actual effect other than to anger the
parent state and pull the international community into a war that it
cannot win. In such cases, even if the secessionist entity is
somewhat strong, the parent state could simply ignore the
recognition decision, use its strength to conquer the secessionist
entity or bring it better under its control, and continue in its bad
behavior. The threat of recognition and the recognition decision
thus would fail to deter the parent state from its bad behavior and
would fail to incapacitate the parent state from abusing human
rights within the secessionist entity. The decision would also
reduce the credibility, and thus the general deterrent effect, of such
threats by the international community in the future. Finally, in
cases where the parent state and the secessionist entity are in
24 For further discussion of cases where recognition would not serve the
purposes, either to deter or incapacitate, of the sanction theory of recognition
despite human rights abuses, as well as cases where, on the whole, recognition
would have a severely negative effect on the international community, see infra
Section 4.3 on the situation in Chechnya and Russia.
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conflict, the recognition decision might raise the stakes of the
conflict and, to the degree the international community felt
compelled to back up its recognition decision, could potentially
embroil other states or the entire international community in
military conflict, all with no positive benefits gained. While the
“just cause” theory would recommend recognition in this situation
if the secessionist entity had been the subject of the parent state’s
abuse, the sanction theory, recognizing the ineffectiveness of the
recognition decision as a sanction, would not, regardless of
whether a nexus existed between the parent state’s bad behavior
and the secessionist entity.
Similarly, there may be cases where the sanction theory does
not call for recognition despite the bad behavior of the parent state,
the presence of a secessionist entity, and a set of circumstances
where recognition of the secessionist entity would have some
deterrent effect on the parent state. As a general matter, just as the
sanction theory of recognition shifts the focus of the recognition
decision to the parent state, it simultaneously shifts the focus of the
recognition decision away from the secessionist entity. Sanctions
work best the more readily they are available; the more invariably
the sanction follows the bad behavior, the more the sanction serves
to deter such bad behavior and the stronger the incentives of the
parent state to avoid such bad behavior become. Thus the sanction
theory of recognition encourages the international community to
think very little about the secessionist entity; the more the
international community analyzes secessionist entities and the
more it demands from such entities before granting recognition,
the less frequently the recognition decision can serve as a deterrent
to bad behavior. To maximize the availability of the recognition
decision, and thus of its deterrent effect, it is best if the standards
for the secessionist entity are kept as low as possible.
Pushing somewhat in the opposite direction, however, is the
notion that the product of the recognition decision should not be
worse than the problem that called for recognition in the first place.
The justification for a sanction theory of recognition is that it makes
the world better off: its purpose is to deter bad behavior. Even if a
particular recognition decision would successfully deter some bad
behavior, it would not be justified if, on the whole, the recognition
decision made the world worse off. For instance, consider a
secessionist entity that appears not to have any chance as a viable
state, and thus appears likely to collapse into a power vacuum
upon independence. Taking into account the dangers to human
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rights and the international community that may result,25
recognition should not be granted if such negative consequences
are not justified by the positive consequences of the recognition
decision’s deterrent effect.
Similarly, if the international community determines that the
secessionist entity, upon recognition, would engage in its own
human rights abuses, recognition should be avoided if the negative
consequences of such bad behavior would outweigh the positive
consequences of the deterrent effect of the sanction. That is, what
states should demand of the secessionist entity is that its nature
and its commitments indicate that its existence as a recognized
state, with the benefits of the deterrent effect of recognition as a
sanction taken into account, will not make the world worse off
than had the secessionist entity remained a part of its parent state.
The nature of these demands further distinguishes the sanction
theory of recognition from “just cause plus” theories. Under the
sanction theory, the level of the demands placed upon the
secessionist entity depends on the expected effects of the
recognition decision.
If the parent state’s bad behavior is
particularly acute, or the deterrent power of recognizing the
secessionist entity is particularly high, then the sanction theory of
recognition tolerates recognizing a secessionist entity that is
comparatively less viable or more badly behaved, so long as the
benefits of using recognition as a sanction in that instance
outweigh the negative effects of the recognition decision.
Conversely, if the parent state’s bad behavior, while worthy of
sanction, is not particularly acute, or the deterrent power of
recognizing the secessionist entity is not particularly high, then the
secessionist entity will have to be more viable and better behaved
to ensure that the benefits of using recognition as a sanction are not
outweighed by the negative effects of the recognition decision.
Under a “just cause plus” theory, on the other hand, the
requirements for secessionist entities are static.26 Others have
suggested a requirement that any secessionist entity must meet a
presumably constant standard of respect for minority rights to be
25 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, The Human Rights Crisis in Somalia, Mar. 30,
2008, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/03/30/human-rights-crisis-somalia
(documenting the human rights abuses and international security problems that
have arisen in Somalia during its years of state collapse).
26 See BUCHANAN, supra note 3, at 208 (discussing the growing consensus in
international law that distributive justice matters).
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This has the
an acceptable candidate for recognition.27
consequence of nullifying the power of recognition as a sanction in
certain circumstances where recognition would make the world
better off. For example, if parent state A is committing atrocious
human rights violations throughout its territory, and secessionist
entity B falls just below the “just cause plus” theory’s standard for
recognition, even if threatening to recognize B would perfectly
deter A’s bad behavior, under the “just cause plus” theory, A
knows that the international community’s hands are tied; the
international community cannot recognize B, no matter what A
does. Under the sanction theory, the bad behavior or uncertain
commitments of the secessionist entity give the parent state no
such license; as long as the positive effects brought about by the
sanction outweigh the negative effects of recognition, the state can
be threatened and punished with recognition of the secessionist
entity.28
This may result in the recognition of certain secessionist entities
that are, in and of themselves, bad. Buchanan worries that
recognizing badly behaved secessionist entities may make the
international community “accomplices in injustice.”29 But under
the sanction theory, while the international community would be,
in some sense, aiding the injustices committed by the newly
recognized and bad state, it would do so only to end injustices
committed by the parent state, and only after determining that, on
the whole, the benefits outweighed the costs. While this may be
problematic in some philosophical sense, the international
community is only guilty of doing the best it can to make things
27 See GRANT, supra note 12, at 96–98 (discussing the increasingly important
role of minorities’ rights guarantees in state recognition in the context of the
changing focus of minorities’ rights; with special emphasis on Russia, Croatia, and
Slovenia).
28 In addition to eliminating the requirement of a nexus between the parent
state’s bad behavior and recognition for the secessionist entity, and basing the
requirements for the secessionist entity on a sliding scale related to the
circumstances and behavior of the parent state, the sanction theory also leads us
to talk about recognition in different terms than “just cause” theories. Under the
sanction theory, we express our thinking by saying, “Parent state A has been bad,
and so we will recognize secessionist entity B;” under the “just cause” theory, we
express it through “rights talk,” saying, “Secessionist entity B has been mistreated,
and so deserves to be recognized as a state.” This dulls the moral condemnation
that should accompany the recognition decision, moral condemnation that, under
the sanction theory, should theoretically influence players in the international
community to avoid abusing human rights.
29 BUCHANAN, supra note 3, at 167–68.
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better.
Thus the international community’s primary sin is
contributing to an unfortunate reversal of moral luck; in
attempting to stop one set of human rights abuses, it may lead to
another, although lesser, set of human rights abuses.
It should be noted, however, that all tools of international law
seem to have this same problem: they shift negative consequences
from an abused population to another, potentially innocent,
population. Economic sanctions, for instance, are designed to
convince governments to go easier on minority groups; but they
inevitably lead to making the country as a whole poorer, resulting
in suffering for potentially innocent people. The international
community’s squeamishness about affecting moral luck should not
stop it from adopting a theory of recognition that, on the whole,
would deter more bad behavior than it would enable.
In addition to the international community being able to make
demands of the secessionist entity at the point of recognition
(including, for instance, demanding a temporary peacekeeping
presence), once the secessionist entity is recognized, it is subject to
all of the same sanctions that are available for use against other
states, including the threat of recognition of a sub-secessionist
entity as a sanction. Additionally, to the degree that a “just cause
plus” theory only demands “credible commitments” to justice,30 it
gets only that: credible commitments. These, like other principles
of international law to which the secessionist entity has not
committed, will need to be enforced by the international
community, just as if no commitments had been made.
Further cabining this concern is an essential insight into the
nature of deterrence: like all sanctions, to the degree that
recognition works as a deterrent, it need not be implemented in
fact. Were the sanction to be completely efficacious, and to deter
fully all human rights abuses, it would simply never be necessary
to impose the sanction. Thus, while the sanction theory of
deterrence is, on its face, a theory about making recognition
decisions, to the degree that it is efficacious it requires only that the
international community threaten to recognize secessionist entities
as new states and not that the international community ever
actually recognize them.
The philosophy behind the sanction theory of recognition is
straightforward: recognition should be used like every other tool

30

Id. at 244.
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of human rights enforcement available to the international
community:
to sanction bad behavior.
The international
community has very few tools at its disposal for enforcing human
rights; by focusing on deterring the bad behavior of the parent
state and eliminating the requirement of a nexus between the bad
behavior and the secessionist entity, the sanction theory ensures
that recognition will be as effective a tool for human rights
enforcement as possible.
While the sanction theory of recognition is quite novel in its
approach to recognition, it fits reasonably well within the confines
of international law on statehood and recognition, although it
counsels rejection of certain proposals that have been made in both
areas. Section 3 will outline the nature of states and recognition
generally, as well as previously proposed theories of recognition,
and place the sanction theory of recognition within the framework
of currently existing international law, theory, and practice.
3.

SITUATING THE SANCTION THEORY IN THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF RECOGNITION

3.1. Statehood
States are the primary building blocks of the international
community. While other entities such as non-governmental
organizations, autonomous units, secessionist movements, and
international entities like NATO and the U.N. play important roles
on the international stage, states have “the widest range of rights,
duties, and legal capacity under the rules of international law.”31
But what makes an entity a state? Like sailors to the siren’s song,
no writer seems able to resist beginning by citing the requirements
for statehood laid out in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the
Rights and Duties of States.32 The Convention requires that the
entity possess four characteristics: “(a) a permanent population;
(b) a defined territory; (c) [a] government; and (d) [the] capacity to
enter into relations with other states.”33 The Convention has at its

31 M. J. PETERSON, RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS: LEGAL DOCTRINE AND STATE
PRACTICE, 1815–1995, 1 (1997).
32 GRANT, supra note 12, at 6 n.26 (collecting sources).
33 Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19
[hereinafter Montevideo Convention].
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core “concepts of effectiveness and territoriality:”34 the entity must
have a government that effectively controls an actual territory.
In addition to its frequent citation in the literature, numerous
governments have expressed their concepts of statehood in nearly
identical terms: the United States Department of State has
suggested that states must have “effective control over a clearly
defined territory and population; an organized governmental
administration of that territory; and a capacity to act effectively to
conduct foreign relations and to fulfill international obligations.”35
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States says that “a state is an entity that has a defined territory and
a permanent population, under the control of its own government,
and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal
relations with other such entities.”36 The Restatement notes that
these requirements are drawn from the Montevideo Convention
and claims that the requirements are generally accepted in
international law.37 The Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom
has made similar pronouncements.38
The Montevideo requirements, however, despite their frequent
quotation by intellectuals and politicians alike, are not as firmly
required by international law as many seem to suggest. As a
matter of international law, the “Montevideo definition . . . [i]f it
was binding at all . . . was binding only on the small number of
Western Hemisphere states that were party to it. Though signed at
Montevideo by nineteen states, the Convention was ratified by
only five . . . .”39 As a practical matter, numerous entities are or
have been regarded as states by the international community
without meeting the Montevideo requirements.
The requirement of a “permanent population” amounts to very
little: states with populations as small as “Andorra, Liechtenstein,
Nauru, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Tuvalu and many

34
35

1976)).

GRANT, supra note 12, at 6.
Id. (quoting Notice, U.S. Dep’t. of State Press Relations Office (Nov. 1,

36 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
201 (1987).
37 Id. § 201 cmt. a.
38 A.V. Lowe & Colin Warbrick, Recognition of States, 41 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.
473, 480 (1992) (quoting the Foreign Minister).
39 Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its
Discontents, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 403, 456 (1999).
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others” are considered states, despite minimal populations.40 The
requirement of a “defined territory” is similarly unrestrictive:
Nauru, for instance, is approximately twenty-one square
kilometers in area.41 The requirement that the territory be
“defined” also seems to be overlooked in international practice.
Albania and Yemen were acknowledged as states “without fully
delimited or defined boundaries;” The Congo was acknowledged
as a state even though a significant part, Katanga, “was actively
engaged in a secessionist attempt;” and Israel, Kuwait, and
Mauritania have been accepted as states in the face of claims by
other states to the entirety of their territory.42 As a practical matter,
in the context of entities attempting to secede, it seems clear that
any such entity will conceive of itself as having territory, in which
there will undoubtedly be some population, and thus these first
two requirements do not appear as if they will ever serve to
exclude an entity from qualifying as a state.
The requirement that the entity have a “government” that
exercises “effective control” also seems to place little actual
restriction on the practice of the international community. The
Congo was acknowledged as a state in the midst of a civil war and
with “governing structures [that] were completely ineffective for a
number of years;” the U.N. considered Rwanda and Burundi to be
states “even though the General Assembly openly acknowledged
that they did not fulfill the traditional criterion of effective
government;” Angola was similarly considered a state, despite
undergoing a civil war “with three competing would-be
governments all proclaiming their rule.”43
The international community also acts as if statehood persists
even when the entity suffers an almost total loss of effective control
over the territory, such as with Cambodia and Lebanon “during
their periods of near-total collapse,”44 the continued existence of
the Baltic states and Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia in the
minds of the Allies during the Second World War, and Somalia
today.45
France seems to have regarded Poland and
SCOTT PEGG, INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AND THE DE FACTO STATE 46 (1998).
Id.
42 Id. at 46–47.
43 Id. at 47.
44 Id.
45 Matthew N. Bathon, Note, The Atypical International Status of the Holy See,
34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 597, 621 (2001); Grant, supra note 39, at 435.
40
41
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Czechoslovakia as states during the First World War as well, even
though Poland had possessed no territory or effective control for
100 years and Czechoslovakia had never had either territory or
effective control.46 More recently, the international community
almost uniformly acknowledged Bosnia and Herzegovina as a
state, at a period in time when it had almost no effective control
over its territory, and when its boundaries, and even its claim to
any territory whatsoever, were hotly contested by numerous other
entities.47
As for engaging in foreign relations, Liechtenstein “remained a
state after transferring control of its foreign affairs to
Switzerland . . . .”48 More generally, the Vatican City is widely
regarded as a state,49 even though it has a population of
approximately five-hundred people, none of whom are
permanent,50 its territory is a robust one-hundred and six acres,51
and it is heavily dependent on Italy for even its most basic
services.52 On the flip side of the coin, the international community
has acted as if entities that meet all of these criteria, including
Somaliland, pre-independence Eritrea, and the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus, among others, were not states.53 Given the laxity
of these requirements, it seems unlikely that many secessionist
movements, by definition claiming some territory with some
population, will fail to meet them, at least to the extent that their
governments are required to be no more effectively in control or
capable of conducting foreign relations than states like Somalia and
occupied Czechoslovakia.
Despite the fact that numerous states, present and past, at their
inception and during their continuation, have failed to live up to
the Montevideo requirements, numerous commentators have
argued that statehood requires more. James Crawford has argued
that independence is a requirement of statehood.54
For
Grant, supra note 39, at 436.
Roland Rich, Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet
Union, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 36, 49–51 (1993).
48 Bathon, supra note 45, at 616.
49 Id. at 599.
50 Id. at 609.
51 Id. at 604.
52 Id. at 616.
53 PEGG, supra note 40, at 52.
54 JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1979).
46
47
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independence to be distinct from effective control, it must mean
that the state is capable of standing on its own. Understood in that
way, “any number of entities widely agreed to be states might not
be properly termed as such.”55 The Vatican City is clearly
dependent on Italy in a sense that makes it non-independent;56 Iraq
seems currently to maintain itself only through the support of the
United States and other states;57 and Bosnia and Herzegovina was
clearly reliant on the support of NATO, the U.N., and numerous
states at the time that it gained wide acknowledgment as a state.58
While Crawford and others have also argued for a requirement
of independence in a sense connected with the entity’s “legality or
illegality of origin,”59 this requirement seems more properly
considered as a proposed requirement for recognition than
statehood, given that an entity that has come into being through
illegal means operates indistinguishably from one that has come
into being through legal means, with the exception of how the
entity might be viewed by the international community, and so it
will be discussed along with other proposed criteria for recognition
infra. Similarly, the proposals made by some critics that entities
must go through popular referenda on independence to be states,60
that entities must have democratic governments to be states,61 and
that entities must respect the rights of minorities to be states62 seem
clearly to belong to the realm of recognition decisions and not
definitional statehood. As such, they will be discussed infra.
Another proposed criterion for statehood is that the entity must
make a claim that it is a state. According to The Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, “[w]hile the
traditional definition does not formally require it, an entity is not a
state if it does not claim to be a state.”63 This criterion seems to be
driven entirely by consideration of the case of Taiwan, which “does
Grant, supra note 39, at 438.
Bathon, supra note 45, at 616.
57 See, e.g., Abigail Hauslohner/Mahmudiya, Iraqi Troops: Asleep on the Job?,
TIME, Apr. 21, 2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article
/0,8599,1732617,00.html (describing Iraq’s dependence on U.S. military aid).
58 Rich, supra note 47, at 49–51.
59 PEGG, supra note 40, at 48.
60 Grant, supra note 39, at 440.
61 Id. at 442.
62 Id. at 444.
63 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
201 cmt. f (1987).
55
56
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not claim to be Taiwan, but rather the Republic of China.”64 This
requirement seems, on its face, to be a rather absurd ad hoc
addition to the requirements of statehood, added simply to explain
a singular situation that could be more truthfully explained by
appeals to the particular reality of that situation. Taiwan clearly is
a state insofar as “state” is a descriptive term; it is at least as
effective as numerous other entities that are acknowledged to be
states. The willingness to call Taiwan a non-state as opposed to an
“unrecognized state” seems simply to be an extension of the
decision not to recognize Taiwan. Further highlighting the ad hoc
nature of this criterion, as far as secessionist movements go, this
criterion will never come into play; by definition, secessionist
entities claim to be states, and so this criterion will not serve to
limit the international community from recognizing secessionist
movements as states.
To the degree that statehood is a prerequisite for recognition,
the sanction theory of recognition would impel us to keep our
standards for statehood as low as possible. By keeping the
standards for statehood low, and, in turn, lowering the bar for
recognition, recognition would be available more frequently for
use as a sanction, and thus could serve more effectively as a
deterrent to human rights abuses. Given that the requirements of
territory and population will almost always be satisfied in the
weak sense in which they are required in practice, they should
pose no impediment to the efficacy of the sanction theory of
recognition.
Similarly, given the low standards set by international practice
for the requirements of a government with effective control over
the entity and of a government with the capacity to engage in
foreign relations, these requirements should not hinder the
sanction theory of recognition. Bosnia was granted recognition at a
time when any effective control its government might have had
over its territory was completely dependent upon foreign
support.65 To the degree that a secessionist entity will not be able
to have anything approaching effective control over any of its
territory even with significant foreign intervention, recognition of
the entity will not be able to function as a sanction; the parent state
should have no trouble reasserting its dominion over the

64
65

Grant, supra note 39, at 439.
Rich, supra note 47, at 57.
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secessionist entity, and the recognition will have been in vain.
Even were that not the case, recognition of such entities would
likely lead to power vacuums and the human rights abuses that
tend to follow them, making them inappropriate candidates for
recognition.66
For the sanction theory to be most efficacious, the nonMontevideo requirement of independence (in the sense of not
requiring external support) should be rejected, so as to make
recognition more readily available as a sanction. As this section
suggests, however, rejecting the requirement of independence and
keeping the Montevideo requirements easily satisfied—i.e.,
conditions conducive to the most efficacious use of the sanction
theory of recognition—does not move current practice far, if at all,
from its current state. Thus, while the sanction theory pushes for a
low bar for statehood under international law, current practice has
already done most of the work on that front.
3.2. Recognition
Just as there is room for the sanction theory of recognition
within the confines of international law and practice on statehood,
there is room for the sanction theory of recognition within the legal
framework and practice of recognition. As a general matter,
Recognition is a procedure whereby the governments of
existing states respond to certain changes in the world
community. It may also be a means by which existing
states seek to effect changes in that community . . . .
Recognition is an authoritative statement issued by
competent foreign policy decision-makers in a country.
Through it, those decision-makers signal the willingness of
their state to treat with a new state or government or to
accept that consequences, either factual or legal, flow from
a new situation.67
In the context of states, recognition of an entity as a state
signifies that the recognizing state accepts that the recognized
entity is a state and that the recognizing state will extend to the
66 Cf. Human Rights Watch, The Human Rights Crisis in Somalia, supra note 25
(chronicling the human rights violations in Somalia after the fall of the
government).
67 GRANT, supra note 12, at xix.
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newly recognized state all of the benefits that come with statehood
and formal relations. Recognition is, then, extremely important in
the context of secessionist entities: “[h]istorically, international
recognition of statehood has been the major foreign policy goal of
any secessionist movement.”68
Just as no writing on statehood is complete without reference
to the Montevideo convention, writings on recognition appear to
be subject to an unwritten rule that they must distinguish the
constitutive and declaratory theories on the nature of recognition.
Under the constitutive theory, recognition is essential to being a
state: before an entity can be a state, it must be recognized by other
states.69 Thus, when a state recognizes an entity as a new state, it is
doing something constructive; it is helping to transform the entity
from some non-state thing into a state. Under the declaratory
theory, recognition is simply “an acknowledgment of statehood
already achieved.”70 Thus, when a state recognizes an entity as a
new state, it is not contributing to the transformation of the entity
into a new state, but simply announcing that it understands that
the entity has fulfilled the requirements of statehood, and is thus a
new state.
While writers tend to understand the difference as significant,
with declaratory theory belonging to the realm of “legal principle”
and constitutive theory belonging to the realm of “statecraft,” there
is enormous play in the joints.71 Before the declaratory theory can
mean anything, the contours of what it is to be a state must be
firmly established. As discussed above, the requirements of
statehood are of dubious legal validity, uncertain, and, in practice,
not particularly meaningful. And while some have suggested that,
under the constitutive theory, the recognition decision “is an act of
unfettered political will divorced from binding considerations of
legal principle,”72 this is not necessarily so. The constitutive
theory, at its core, simply requires that entities be recognized as
states to be states; it is, of course, possible that states could make
these decisions based on “considerations of legal principle.”
68 PAVKOVIC & RADAN, supra note 15, at 11 (quoting JAMES B. CRAWFORD, THE
CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 376 (2nd ed. 2007)).
69 GRANT, supra note 12, at 2.
70 Id. at 4.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 2 (quoting HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 41 (1948)).
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Similarly, the declaratory theory need not be entirely devoid of
political considerations: if the criteria for statehood are determined
on the basis of politics, then, in some sense, the declaratory theory
simply carries forward political decisions under the guise of legal
reasoning. Similarly, if determining whether or not states have
successfully met the legal criteria for statehood is left to individual
political actors, then politics will likely figure in that decision as
well.73
The essential distinction between the two theories comes from
what seems to be an added-on feature of the two theories. As
typically conceptualized, under the constitutive theory, recognition
decisions are made entirely “at the discretion of the individual
state” making the decision,74 while under the declaratory model,
announcements of recognition are considered to be “an automatic
duty” whenever an entity has fulfilled the requirements of
statehood.75 The theories do not simply envision a different role
for recognition decisions in the formation of states, but also a
different level of freedom for the states making recognition
decisions.
The sanction theory of recognition can fit under either the
declaratory or constitutive theories. Under the constitutive theory,
the sanction theory works if states choose to recognize secessionist
entities as states when doing so would serve as an effective
sanction for the bad behavior of the parent state; this act of
recognition would help turn the secessionist entity into a state.
Under the declaratory theory, the sanction theory works if we
simply choose to make it a requirement for statehood that coming
into being as a state serves as an effective sanction for the bad
behavior of the parent state; the act of recognition would then
simply acknowledge that the secessionist entity fit the
requirements of statehood and was a state. Of course, making the
fact that a state’s coming into being serves as a sanction against a
parent state a requirement of statehood is a somewhat strange
maneuver, but it is not clear why it would be impermissible.
Some authors have perceived that the debate between the
declaratory and constitutive theories are outdated, and that, in fact,
73 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 202 reporters’ note 1 (1987) (discussing the two theories of the
recognition of statehood by other states).
74 GRANT, supra note 12, at 3.
75 Id. at 4.
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“the critical tension in recognition law is concentrated along two
axes . . . first, along an axis between recognition conceived as legal
act and recognition conceived as political act; and, second, along an
axis between a collective and a unilateral process of recognition.”76
The sanction theory, however, is somewhat indifferent between
both poles of both axes. By suggesting that all recognition
decisions should be made with the effectiveness of the sanction in
mind, the theory is, in some sense legally oriented: it suggests that
all decisions should be made uniformly for the same reason: if
recognition would be an effective sanction, it should be granted.
Thus, a legal rule could carry out the sanction theory. However,
the sanction theory could be carried into effect through political
action: if states simply willingly embraced the sanction theory as
their guide to their recognition decisions, and acted on it in all
cases, the theory would lead to the same recognition decisions as if
the theory were taken as a legal rule. Of course, the chances of this
happening in the real world are somewhat slim, and so the
sanction theory would likely work better as a legal rule; then again,
getting states to obey legal rules is easier said than done.
Additionally, the sanction theory is clearly, in some sense, a
political rule; it is designed to carry out a specific political
objective: stopping states from committing human rights abuses.
On the other hand, this does not disqualify it as a legal rule; most,
if not all, legal rules are designed to carry out a “political” purpose.
As for whether recognition is done through a collective or
unilateral process, the sanction theory is once again somewhat
indifferent. If all states act unilaterally, but all according to the
sanction theory, then the theory would have the same practical
effects as if recognition decisions were left up to a collective
process under which recognition decisions were determined
according to the sanction theory. As with the legal-political axis,
the sanction theory would likely be more effective in practice if
determined through a collective mechanism: the chances of all
states acting unilaterally in the same way in all instances is slim.
Then again, collective processes are by definition influenced by
constituent actors, and so there is no guarantee that even a
collective process would work perfectly. The sanction theory is
also, in some sense, inherently “collective” in nature, in that its
goal is a collective one: it acts to prevent human rights abuses,

76

Id. at xx.
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rather than further the ends of one particular state or another. Of
course, it could be argued that, in the long run, it is in the interests
of all states, both from a collective and a singular point of view, to
prevent human rights abuses on a global scale. Further, the
efficacy of the sanction theory is dependent on recognition or nonrecognition being taken by a large number of states; the effects of
each recognition decision are cumulative on the parent state and
the secessionist entity. The sanction theory thus would seem to
operate most effectively as a legal rule applied through a collective
process, but could also succeed as a political rule applied through a
unilateral process, as long as it was accepted widely and followed
consistently.
The weight of scholarly opinion seems to come down on the
side of the declaratory view of recognition, with the constitutive
theory of recognition being attacked for theoretical and logical
reasons.77 But these attacks tend to focus on the idea that
recognition is not essential for statehood, rather than attempting to
argue that states are under a legal obligation to recognize entities
as states if they fulfill the criteria for statehood.78 The Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States seems to
adopt this composite view: while under Section 201, following the
Montevideo Convention, an entity is declared to be a state if “it has
a defined territory and permanent population, under the control of
its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to
engage in, formal relations with other such entities,”79 under
Section 202 it is made clear that “[a] state is not required to accord
formal recognition to any other state but is required to treat as a
state an entity meeting the requirements of Section 201.”80
That is, following the declaratory theory, whether or not an
entity is a state is entirely independent of whether or not the entity
has been recognized as a state by other states; but, following the
constitutive theory, states are not obligated to recognize an entity
as a state even if the entity has met all of the requirements for
77 See id. at 19–22 (critiquing the constitutive view of recognition as a
contractual event and highlighting practical disjunctions posed by constitutivism;
including the proposition that unrecognized communities have no duties under
international law and the difficulty of reconciling constitutive theory with
retroactive juridical effect of recognition).
78 See id.
79 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
201 (1987).
80 Id. § 202.
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statehood. According to the Reporter’s Notes, this combination
“tends toward the declaratory view, but the practical differences
between the two theories have grown smaller . . . . [T]he
constitutive theory lost most of its significance when it was
accepted that states had the obligation . . . to treat as a state any
entity having the characteristics set forth in Section 201.”81 For all
practical purposes, the freedom of states to grant or deny
recognition renders the debate between the constitutive and
declaratory theories of recognition extremely academic. Whether
an entity needs recognition to be a state or not, most of the benefits
of statehood only come when recognition is granted: “an entity
will fully enjoy the status and benefits of statehood only if a
significant number of other states consider it to be a state and treat
it as such, in bilateral relations or by admitting it to major
international organizations.”82
It is cold comfort to be an
unrecognized state that knows it’s a state because some theoretical
requirements have been met. Until other states recognize the
entity as a state, it will still be in a significantly inferior position in
the international community.
In addition to the Restatement, numerous sources acknowledge
that recognition decisions are made at the discretion of the
recognizing government in practice.83 According to the United
Nations, “[w]hile states may regard it as desirable to follow certain
legal principles in according or withholding recognition, the
practice of states shows that the act of recognition is still regarded
as essentially a political decision, which each state decides in
accordance with its own free appreciation of the situation.”84
NATO has indicated that recognition is “entirely a matter for
individual member states.”85 And, most importantly, given that
they are the primary players in the recognition game, “most states
regard recognition as a political act,” made at their discretion.86

Id. § 202, n.1.
Id. § 202 cmt. b.
83 See id. § 202, n.2.
84 GRANT, supra note 12, at 22 (quoting U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., at 19, U.N. Doc.
S/1466 (Jan./May 1950)).
85 Id. at 23 (quoting Letter from N.W.G. Sherwen, Office of Information and
Press, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to Thomas D. Grant, Senior Research
Fellow, Cambridge Univ. (Mar. 19, 1996) (on file with Grant)).
86 PEGG, supra note 40, at 129 (quoting ALAN JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD:
THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 148 (1986)).
81
82
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Recent practice seems to carry this notion out, especially
concerning the break-up of the former Yugoslavia.
After Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from
the Yugoslav Federation in June of 1991, fighting broke out.87 After
attempts to broker peace failed, the European Community came to
the conclusion that the Yugoslav Federation was in the process of
dissolution.88
Having given up on keeping the Federation
together, and believing that multiple states would be emerging
from its dust and ashes, the European Community determined that
it needed to come up with criteria for recognizing the entities that
emerged as states.89 Meeting in December of 1991, the Foreign
Ministers of the member states of the European Community came
up with a “Declaration on the Guidelines on Recognition of new
States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.”90 The very title of
the document indicates that the European Community viewed
recognition as a discretionary practice, framing it in terms of the
requirements states had to meet in order to achieve recognition, not
in terms of what requirements entities had to meet in order to
become states.
The content of the document further indicated that the
European Community neither believed that recognition was
essential to statehood (as the constitutive theory holds) nor that the
member states were obligated to recognize entities as states merely
because they met the requirements for statehood (as the
declaratory theory holds). According to the Declaration, “[t]he
Community and its Member States” were prepared to recognize
“subject to the normal standards of international practice and the
political realities in each case, those new States which . . . have
constituted themselves on a democratic basis, have accepted the
appropriate international obligations, and have committed
themselves in good faith to a peaceful process and to
negotiations.”91 Not only does this statement explicitly recognize
that the recognition decisions would be made based on “the
political realities in each case,” but it also conditioned recognition
Lowe & Warbrick, supra note 38, at 475.
Id. at 475–476.
89 See id. at 476 (noting the importance of protecting minority rights in the
context of recognition).
90 Id. at 477.
91 Id. at 477 (quoting the Declaration on the Guidelines on Recognition of new
States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (hereinafter the Declaration)).
87
88
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on a number of requirements beyond simple statehood: the
entities had to be democratically constituted, accept their
international obligations, and be committed to “a peaceful process
and to negotiations.”92
In addition to these three initial criteria beyond statehood, the
Declaration added numerous other criteria for recognition. To be
recognized, states needed to demonstrate their “respect for the
provisions of the” U.N. Charter and other international law
documents, “especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy
and human rights;”93 they needed to provide sufficient “guarantees
for the rights of . . . ethnic and national groups and minorities”;94
they needed to “respect . . . the inviolability of all frontiers” and
acknowledge that they could “only be changed by peaceful means
and by common agreement;”95 they needed to commit to
“disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation” as well as “security
and regional stability;”96 they had to be willing to “settle by
agreement, including . . . arbitration, all questions concerning State
succession and regional disputes”;97 finally, there would not be
recognition for states “which are the result of aggression,” and
recognition decisions “would take account of the effect of
recognition on neighbouring States.”98
These additional
requirements, numerous and independent of the basic notions of
statehood, made it clear that the European Community viewed
recognition as a process that could be conditioned quite openly on
more than simple statehood.99
Additionally, the European Community imposed specific
requirements on states emerging from the former Yugoslavia:
those states had to accept “provisions on human rights suggested
by the EC Conference on Yugoslavia and the continued work of the
Conference and . . . the work of the Security Council in
Yugoslavia.”100 As a last, somewhat unusual requirement, each
state had to adopt “constitutional and political guarantees ensuring
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Id. (quoting the Declaration).
Id. (quoting the Declaration).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 478 (quoting the Declaration).
See Rich, supra note 47, at 56–57.
Lowe &Warbrick, supra note 38, at 478.
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that it has no territorial claim towards a neighboring Community
State, including the use of language which implies territorial
claims.”101 The fact that requirements for recognition could be
crafted specifically for states emerging from Yugoslavia, rather
than for all entities wishing to be recognized as states, further
reveals the discretionary and political nature of the recognition
decision. The final esoteric requirement, regarding “the use of
language which implies territorial claims,” “was inserted at the
insistence of Greece, concerned about possible claims (and even the
use of the name) by Macedonia which might imply designs on the
northern Greek province of Macedonia.”102 It seems implausible
that this linguistic requirement could possibly be a true
requirement of statehood, and the process through which it was
inserted further makes clear the discretionary and political nature
of recognition in the eyes of the European Community.
Just as the Declaration indicated that recognition was
independent of statehood, so, too, did the actual practice of
recognition that ensued. Entities that wished to be recognized as
states were to apply to the Badinter Commission, a commission
specifically set up by the European Community for resolving the
situation in the former Yugoslavia.103 If the application met with
the Commission’s approval, based on the guidelines for
recognition, the European Community and its member states
would grant the entity recognition.104 If it did not, member states
were free to choose for themselves whether or not they would
grant the entity recognition, further indicating the discretionary
and political nature of the decision.105
After reviewing the applications of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia,
and Macedonia, the Commission found that Slovenia and
Macedonia should be recognized, while Croatia and Bosnia should
not.106 According to the Commission, Croatia’s constitution
afforded inadequate protection to the minorities within its borders

Id.
Id.
103 See A.V. Lowe & Colin Warbrick, Recognition of States Part 2, 42 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 433, 433 (1993) (discussing how Yugoslavia’s Secretary of State
awaited Badinter Commission decisions to resolve the Yugoslav crisis); Id. at 433
& n.3.
104 Lowe & Warbrick, supra note 38, at 478.
105 Id.
106 Lowe & Warbrick, supra note 103, at 434.
101
102
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while Bosnia needed to demonstrate that its people were, in fact, in
favor of becoming a new state.107 Following the Commission’s
advice, the European Community and its member states quickly
recognized Slovenia as a state.108 In response to the Commission’s
ruling, Bosnia held a referendum on independence.109 Bosnian
Serbs, more than a third of Bosnia’s population, boycotted the vote,
but of those who did vote, Bosnian Muslims and Croatians, more
than ninety-nine percent endorsed independence.110 Following the
vote, the European Community recognized Bosnia as a state.111
That was where the European Community stopped following
the Badinter Commission’s advice. Despite the Commission’s
recommendation against recognizing Croatia, the European
Community recognized Croatia as a state, seemingly satisfied with
Croatia’s promises that it would address the Commission’s
constitutional concerns in the near future, a promise upon which,
somewhat unsurprisingly, “Croatia did not immediately
deliver.”112 Despite having set up a legal-seeming Commission, the
European
Community
recognized
Croatia
despite
its
recommendation, affirming the political and discretionary nature
of the recognition decision.
These factors were even more evident in Macedonia’s attempt
to gain recognition. Despite the Commission’s recommendation,
the European Community refrained from recognizing Macedonia
because Greece objected to the use of the name “Macedonia.”113
Eventually, the European Community came to the conclusion that
it would recognize Macedonia if it came up with a different name
that was acceptable to Greece;114 that is, all that stood between
Macedonia and recognition was Greece’s objection to its name.
This continued even after Macedonia “amended its constitution to
meet the Greek concerns and had made internationally legally
binding statements that Macedonia had no territorial designs
against Greece.”115 Eventually, despite retaining the name the
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115

Id.
Id.
Id. at 435.
Id.; Rich, supra note 47, at 50.
Lowe & Warbrick, supra note 103, at 435.
Id. at 434.
Id. at 437.
Id.
Id. at 438.
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“Republic of Macedonia,” Macedonia was recognized by the
European Community and admitted to the United Nations, but
those entities still refer to Macedonia as “the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia,”116 and the name dispute continues to this
day.117 Thus despite the semi-legal appearance of the recognition
process in the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the political and
discretionary nature of the recognition decision, reflecting some
combination of the declaratory and constitutive theories of
recognition, was extremely clear: not only was recognition
specifically conditioned on meeting numerous requirements
beyond those for simple statehood, but recognition was granted
when those conditions were not met, and was withheld when they
were, specifically over something as petty and clearly political as
the name of the new state.
The general law and practice of recognition thus make room for
the sanction theory of recognition. While Section 202 of the
Restatement limits the behavior of states in some way, by requiring
states to treat as a state any entity that meets the requirements for
statehood, recognition is left in general to the discretion of
individual states.118 States are free to choose the standards under
which they grant recognition (or to choose to have no standards at
all); thus under international law and practice, they are free to
choose the sanction theory to structure their recognition decisions.
3.3. Territorial Integrity
Recognition decisions, however, are not entirely discretionary;
the discretion of states and theories of recognition are constrained
by other international norms, like the principle of territorial
integrity. The sanction theory, however, justifies overriding
territorial integrity because of its basis in advancing human rights,
a concept that appears to fit reasonably well within current
international law and practice.

116 See Delegation of the European Union to the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, http://www.delmkd.ec.europa.eu/en/index.htm (last visited Dec. 6,
2009); United Nations, List of Member States, http://www.un.org/members
/list.shtml (last visited Dec. 6, 2009) (using the disputed name).
117 See Associated Press, Macedonian Parliament to Debate UN Proposal on
Ending Name Dispute with Greece, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 28, 2008.
118 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §
202 (1987).
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According to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
of the United States:
[A]ccepting as a state an entity that seeks to secede from
another state, but has not yet succeeded in achieving
complete control of its territory, is an improper interference
in the internal affairs of the parent state, and if the seceding
entity is given military support, may constitute the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity of the parent
state in violation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter.119
In other words, “[p]remature recognition . . . is itself a violation
of the rights of the ‘parent’ state, and, if accompanied by armed
support for the rebels, would constitute the use of force against the
territorial integrity of the parent state contrary to Article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter.”120 States have complete discretion in
their recognition decisions when the secessionist entity at issue has
“complete control of its territory,” and can recognize such states
for the purpose of sanctioning the parent state. However, states
are only justified in engaging in “premature” recognition if they
are warranted in violating the territorial integrity of the parent
state. While this imperative may constrain the discretion of states
under other theories of recognition, it does not affect the sanction
theory. The sanction theory only requires “premature recognition”
(and any recognition at all, for that matter) when the parent state
has been engaging in human rights abuses. Such abuses justify
overriding the territorial integrity of the parent state through
“premature” recognition.
The sanction theory operates unconstrained by territorial
integrity if one of two conditions is true: either there is, in fact, no
prohibition in international law and practice against “premature”
recognition, or international law and practice reflect the notion that
human rights abuses justify “premature” recognition. The widely
accepted recognition of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and
particularly Bosnia suggests that at least one of these conditions is
true.

119
120

Id. § 202 cmt. f.
Id. § 202, n.4.
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When Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence, the
Federal Government of Yugoslavia rejected their claims.121 Their
recognition as independent states by the international community
was certainly not accepted as legitimate by Yugoslavia. In fact, the
federal government protested the recognition as “contrary to the
sovereign rights of Yugoslavia which proceed from international,
contemporary legal documents,”122 although it eventually accepted
the independence of Slovenia.123
For Croatia and Bosnia,
recognition not only came without the consent of the parent state,
but it also came at a time when neither state had “yet succeeded in
achieving complete control of its territory . . . .”124 At the time of
Croatia’s recognition, the federal army was in the middle of
Croatia and actively fighting with the Croatian army.125 The
government of Croatia had no control over more than a third of its
territory.126 Not long after recognition was granted, the U.N. felt it
necessary to constitute a peacekeeping force, UNPROFOR, to help
end the fighting in Croatia.127
Given the necessity for a
peacekeeping force and the fact that the parent state’s military was
still at least partially in control of some of Croatia’s territory, it is
hard to claim that the Croatian government had met a robust
version of the Montevideo Convention’s “effective control”
requirement for statehood, let alone the Restatement’s “complete
control” requirement for non-premature recognition.
The recognition of Bosnia stands out as an even more extreme
example of widely accepted “premature” recognition. In fact, the
Yugoslav federal government specifically condemned it as such.128
Following the vote for independence, there was widespread interethnic fighting in Bosnia.129 During this period, the Yugoslav
National Army had “a substantial presence” on the ground in
121 Lowe & Warbrick, supra note 38, at 475 (“These assertions of statehood
were not acquiesced in by the Federal authorities, nor have they been formally
accepted by them since.”).
122 Id. at 479 (quoting INDEPENDENT, Jan. 16, 1992, at 8).
123 Rich, supra note 47, at 49 (discussing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s
decision on August 13, 1992 to extend recognition to Slovenia).
124 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §
202, cmt. f (1987).
125 Warbrick, supra note 103, at 435.
126 Rich, supra note 47, at 56.
127 Warbrick, supra note 103, at 435.
128 Id.
129 Id.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss2/5

2009]

RECOGNITION AS SANCTION

567

Bosnia.130 International forces, in the form of UNPROFOR, were
also present.131 At the time of recognition, the government had “no
effective control over any areas including the capital city . . . .”132
Not long after recognition, the President of Bosnia went so far as to
say that Bosnia “could not protect its independence without
foreign military aid.”133
The Yugoslav federal government maintained that these facts
proved that the recognition of Bosnia violated international law. In
1993, Bosnia filed an application with the International Court of
Justice with the hope of bringing proceedings against the federal
government of Yugoslavia.
Bosnia accused Yugoslavia of
“genocide, conspiracy and incitement to commit genocide,
complicity in genocide, and a failure to prevent and punish
genocide.”134 In objecting to Bosnia’s application, Yugoslavia
argued that the international community’s recognition of Bosnia
violated international law.135 The Court sidestepped Yugoslavia’s
objections, and found that they had “jurisdiction independent of
Bosnia’s legal soundness as a state.”136
Unsurprisingly,
Yugoslavia’s appointed judge ad hoc, Milenko Kreca, dissented on
the grounds that Bosnia was not truly a state and that the
international community’s recognition of Bosnia was illegal,
following Yugoslavia’s arguments.137
Judge Kreca argued that the international community had
adopted the constitutive view of recognition in its approach to
Bosnia, violating what he argued was the accepted norm, the
declaratory view.138 In his view, by recognizing Bosnia, the
international community was actually attempting to turn it into a
state, violating the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and
impermissibly interfering in Bosnia’s internal affairs.139 Kreca
130
131
132
133

1992)).

Rich, supra note 47, at 50.
Id.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 51 (quoting President Izetbegovic (quoted in ABC NEWS, May 5,

134 Thomas D. Grant, Comment, Territorial Status, Recognition, and Statehood:
Some Aspects of the Genocide Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 33
STAN. J. INT’L L. 305, 306 (1997).
135 Id.
136 Id. at 309.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 326.
139 Id. at 328.
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further suggested that, without external aid, Bosnia could not have
survived; it was only foreign military intervention that allowed
Bosnia to actually function as a state.140 At the time recognition
was granted, the international community envisioned, and later
put in place, a long-term military presence to maintain Bosnia as a
state.141 Thus, at the time of recognition, Bosnia was not clearly a
viable independent state, and, in Judge Kreca’s mind, recognition
was illegally constitutive and disruptive of Yugoslavia’s internal
affairs.
The argument that the international community had adopted
the constitutive theory when it recognized Bosnia is simple word
play. States did not necessarily think that they were constructing a
state through recognition, or even that recognition was an essential
element of Bosnia’s statehood. They might just as well have
thought that recognition would help Bosnia attain the other
attributes necessary for statehood, or that it would help Bosnia,
having already fulfilled the requirements for statehood, maintain
itself as a state. The recognition decisions could simply be viewed
as reflecting a low standard for the requirements for statehood, in
which case the decision would serve simply as an
acknowledgment of statehood, consistent with the declaratory
theory. Judge Kreca and Yugoslavia’s general point, however,
seems valid: these recognition decisions clearly required little
effective control on the part of the state, and cast doubt on whether
there is a real effective prohibition against “premature”
recognition, or that the standards for “premature” recognition are
ever actually met.
In the case of Bosnia, and to a lesser extent Croatia, the
international community recognized entities that were considered
illegal secessionist entities by their parent states; that were engaged
in fierce military conflict against their parent states in the midst of
their own “territory;” that were not in control of significant
portions of their territory; and that were essentially reliant on
external aid, including significant military support, for their
continued existence as states. In recognizing Bosnia and Croatia,
the international community was recognizing extremely weak
entities as states, against the protest of their parent state, at least
partially as a means to ensure their survival as independent

140
141

Id. at 329–30.
Id. at 332.
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entities. The cases of Bosnia and Croatia thus suggest that a
prohibition against “premature” recognition may not be a strong,
or perhaps even weak, principle of international law.
Alternatively, the “premature” recognition of Croatia and
Bosnia may have been justified by the specific situation in
Yugoslavia; that is, while there is a general prohibition against
“premature recognition” in international law and practice, the
prohibition falls away under certain circumstances, specifically, if
the parent state is engaged in human rights abuses. In the case of
Yugoslavia, the federal government’s record on human rights was
atrocious, with the Serb-controlled government engaging in a
strategy of ethnic cleansing that amounted to genocide.142 Given
its behavior, the claims of the central government for respect for its
territorial integrity and non-interference in its internal affairs ring
somewhat hollow. It may be that the federal government was seen
to have forfeited its rights to make these claims.
While this forfeiture principle may not be explicit in
international law,143 in the context of secession, a similar idea has at
least been implied. The 1970 United Nations Declaration on
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations was designed to encourage
decolonization, while simultaneously making it clear that any
“right of self-determination of peoples” was primarily applicable
in the context of decolonization.144 But it also “hinted at the
possibility that established states might forfeit their right to
territorial integrity if they abused the rights of minorities,”145 when
it announced that:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action which would
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial

142 See Raymond Detrez, The Right to Self-Determination and Secession in
Yugoslavia: A Hornets’ Nest of Inconsistencies, in CONTEXTUALIZING SECESSION:
NORMATIVE STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 1, at 122 (describing
the international sympathy the Bosniaks received as a result of “policies of ethnic
cleansing and other atrocities”).
143 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, § 202 (1987) (making no mention of such an exception to the rule against
premature recognition).
144 Diane F. Orentlicher, Separation Anxiety: International Responses to EthnoSeparatist Claims, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 41 (1998).
145 Id. at 42.
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integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
States conducting themselves in compliance with the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples . . . and thus possessed of a government
representing the whole people belonging to the territory
without distinction as to race, creed, or colour.146
Such a statement leaves room to wonder what happens to the
territorial integrity of a state that fails to respect the equal rights of
its people. In the case of Yugoslavia, the crimes of the state went
far beyond treating its people unequally, to the point of genocide,
leaving its claim to territorial integrity in doubt.
The limitation on territorial integrity inherent in the
Declaration on Friendly Relations is subject to two interpretations
given its origin in decolonization: either the parent state loses its
right to territorial integrity as a general matter as a result of its bad
behavior, or the parent state loses its right to territorial integrity
only over the areas in which the violations of equal rights occur.
This first understanding is fully consistent with the sanction theory
of recognition: while the parent state’s bad behavior justifies
recognition of the secessionist entity, there need be no nexus
between the bad behavior and the territory or people of the
secessionist entity. The second understanding, on the other hand,
is not fully consistent with the sanction theory: it would vitiate the
parent state’s claim to territorial integrity only in regards to
secessionist entities that the parent state had abused, and so would
allow recognition of only such abused entities to serve as a
sanction for the parent state’s bad behavior.
More recent pronouncements have suggested that it is the first
understanding, compatible with the sanction theory and requiring
no nexus between the bad behavior and the secessionist entity,
which limits a state’s right to territorial integrity. In 2006, the U.N.
Security Council adopted Resolution 1674, reaffirming “the
provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit
Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity.”147 Paragraph 138 of the Outcome
146 Id. at 42–43, (quoting the Declaration on Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
G.A. Res. 2625, at 340, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (1970)).
147 S.C. Res. 1674, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006), available at http://
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Document acknowledges that “[e]ach individual State has the
responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”148 Paragraph 139
acknowledges that “[t]he international community . . . has the
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and
other peaceful means . . . to help to protect populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity.”149 However, “we are prepared to take collective
action . . . should peaceful means be inadequate and national
authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity.”150 That is, if a state fails to protect its people, armed
intervention, a clear violation of territorial integrity, is permitted.
The essential notions behind these commitments are that the
parent state has a “responsibility” to protect its people and that the
international community has a license to violate the territorial
integrity of the parent state for the purpose of protecting the
people when the state fails to fulfill its responsibility. It is not just
that the people have a right to be protected, but that the state has a
responsibility to protect them. When a state fails to protect, it
forfeits its claim to territorial integrity. It is the abdication of this
responsibility, rather than the suffering of a particular secessionist
entity, that is at the heart of this commitment. This would be
consistent with the sanction theory, which only advocates
recognition in the wake of human rights abuses. Additionally,
there is a requirement that the international community must act to
protect people from human rights abuses. Under the sanction
theory, that is exactly what the international community is doing
when it recognizes a secessionist entity, whether or not the
secessionist entity is the locus of the abuse. The Outcome
Document suggests that the state loses its right to territorial
integrity to the degree that the international community must
violate its territorial integrity to fulfill the state’s failed obligation
to protect its citizens. The international community’s actions are

www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8710.doc.htm.
148 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 138, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/summit2005
/documents.html.
149 Id. ¶ 139.
150 Id.
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limited to actions that will protect the abused population, not to
actions that have some direct spatial relation to the abuse.
This broader loss of territorial integrity is essential, at least in
armed intervention, to effectively protect the victims of abuse. If
parent state A is launching missiles into territory B from various
parts of the country, an armed intervention that simply sends
troops into B, and does not further violate the territorial integrity of
A, will be ineffective. In order to protect the people of B, it will be
necessary for the armed intervention to target the sites throughout
A’s territory from which the missiles are launched. Stopping the
abuse will involve a violation of A’s territorial integrity as a
whole—not just as to B, the precise target of the missiles. The
justification for violating the state’s territorial integrity is that
doing so will stop the abuse; thus the state’s territorial integrity is
forfeited to the degree necessary to end the abuse.
The notion of general applicability is also consistent with the
nature of other sanctions, such as political and economic ones.
Political and economic sanctions are designed to deter bad
behavior, and it is this bad behavior that justifies their imposition.
Presumably, if they were not so justified, their imposition, like
“premature” recognition, would constitute “an improper
interference in the internal affairs of the parent state.”151 But
having been justified by human rights abuses, they are limited not
to a particular area or a particular issue. Instead, they are limited
by their purpose: to end such abuse. Economic sanctions need not
be tailored to a particular geographic region or a particular abusive
economic sector, but only to deterring bad behavior. Thus the
limitation on territorial integrity, seemingly inherent in the
Outcome Document and essential for the full operation of the
sanction theory of recognition, is consistent with the general
approach to responding to human rights abuses.
The case of Yugoslavia also lends support to the notion that a
parent state’s bad behavior leaves its territorial integrity
jeopardized generally, and not just as to the territory in which the
abuse occurs. While Yugoslavia had committed numerous human
rights abuses, they occurred primarily within the territory of

151 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §
202 cmt. f (1987).
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Bosnia and Kosovo, and not in Slovenia and Macedonia.152
Nevertheless, despite the protests of the central Yugoslavian
government that recognition of any entity within its territory
would violate its territorial integrity, the international community
signaled its willingness to consider for recognition, and eventually
recognized, both Slovenia and Macedonia.153 The cases of Slovenia
and Macedonia suggest that Yugoslavia’s bad behavior nullified its
right to territorial integrity generally, and not only with respect to
the territory in which its bad behavior had occurred.
On a related note, Lea Brilmayer has argued that secessionist
entities
cannot be . . . evaluated without reference to claims to
territory . . . . When a group seeks to secede, it is claiming a
right to a particular piece of land, and one must necessarily
inquire into why it is entitled to that particular piece of
land, as opposed to some other piece of land—or to no land
at all.154
While in the general case, this may involve an evaluation of the
group’s “historical claim” to territory and numerous other
factors,155 the outcome of such an evaluation should not be
determinative when the parent state is in the process of abusing
human rights.
In such cases, where the sanction theory
recommends recognition, the secessionist entity’s right to the land
it is receiving need not be grounded on its own merits, but rather
on the fact that the parent state’s bad behavior has cost it the right
to territorial integrity. In cases where the sanction theory
recommends recognition, the secessionist entity’s right to the land
derives from the fact that the parent state, through its bad acts, has
forfeited its right to the land, and the secessionist entity has earned
it because recognizing the secessionist entity will serve as an
effective sanction against the parent state, and not make the world
worse off.
152 See Detrez, supra note 142, at 122 (discussing the reasons for giving
particular groups in the former Yugoslavia the right to national self-determination
and secession).
153 See supra Section 3.2 (describing the process by which Slovenia and
Macedonia were recognized by the international community).
154 Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation,
16 YALE J. INT’L L. 177, 201 (1991).
155 Id. at 199.
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Similarly, while the principle of uti possiditis generally
constrains the recognition of secessionist entities by limiting
recognition to secessionist entities along previously established
territorial lines,156 such considerations should be rejected in the
case of a badly-behaved parent state. Some have argued that the
doctrine is inapplicable to internal borders or to turning any noninternational border into an international border, unless there is an
international agreement or treaty stipulating that the principle be
applied.157 Even if the doctrine is applicable generally, it seems
clear that if the human rights abuses of the parent state can justify
armed intervention and other violations of territorial integrity,
then they should also be able to justify the redrawing of interior
boundary lines, which are frequently “arbitrarily drawn.”158 Just
as a badly-behaved state loses its right to territorial integrity in a
general sense, such a state should also lose any right to set interior
boundaries that constrain recognition by the international
community.
The international community is certainly familiar with the
notion of redrawing internal boundaries in the formation of new
state boundaries when states are guilty of human rights abuses,
most notably in the case of post-World War II West and East
Germany. And the standard in current practice seems to be subject
to modification. The European Community claimed to apply the
principle of uti possiditis in recognizing new states emerging from
Yugoslavia.159 During the initial round of recognition decisions,
Kosovo was denied recognition perhaps in part because it was
merely a “former autonomous province” and not one of
Yugoslavia’s “federal units.”160 But, as will be discussed infra,
Kosovo eventually gained recognition, reflecting either a lowering
156 See Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination and Secession Under International Law,
29 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 305, 313 (2001) (arguing that the principle of uti
possiditis should be inapplicable when certain preconditions, like pre-agreements
on border, are not met).
157 See Peter Radan, Post-Secession International Borders: A Critical Analysis of
the Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Commission, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 50, 58–65
(2000) (arguing that the principle of uti possiditis is not, as claimed by the Badinter
Commission, recognized as a general principle applicable to all cases of
independence).
158 See Halim Moris, Self-Determination: An Affirmative Right or Mere Rhetoric?,
4 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 201, 214 (1997) (discussing self-determination
arguments in favor of secession).
159 Nanda, supra note 156, at 312.
160 Rich, supra note 47, at 61.
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of the standards of the boundaries necessary under the doctrine of
uti possiditis or perhaps a notion that uti possiditis ceases to apply in
the face of a badly-behaved parent state. If uti possiditis ceases to
apply for badly-behaved states, then the sanction theory operates
in harmony with this principle. If, however, uti possiditis operates
generally, but with flexible standards, the sanction theory merely
requires that international law lower its standards for
administrative boundaries—for instance to the level of a
conglomeration of townships, rather than provinces—when
confronted with badly-behaving states.
International law and practice thus reflect either that there is no
true prohibition against “premature” recognition or that the
territorial integrity-based objections underlying the rule against
“premature” recognition fall away in the case of states that commit
human rights abuses, allowing “premature” recognition to the
degree that it is calculated to deter such abuses, considerations that
seem equally applicable to the principle of uti possiditis. Either
stance on “premature” recognition is compatible with the sanction
theory of recognition, which advocates recognition of secessionist
entities only in the face of human rights violations by the parent
state where it can be argued that the parent state has forfeited its
right to territorial integrity and non-interference through its bad
acts. International law and practice on territorial integrity thus
appear to do little to constrain the sanction theory of recognition;
to the degree that they do so, they should be moved in a direction
that does not limit the international community’s use of this
powerful tool for enforcing good behavior.
3.4. Alternative Theories of Recognition
In cases where parent states have not committed human rights
abuses, in cases where the circumstances are such that recognition
would not serve as an effective sanction, or in cases where the
parent state has acquiesced to a secessionist movement, the
sanction theory of recognition would not provide grounds for
recognition. Instead, all of these cases could be met with nonrecognition or could be governed by an alternative theory
providing guidance for recognition decisions in such situations. In
these types of cases, the sanction theory is indifferent as to how
states choose to make their recognition decisions.
In cases where the parent state has committed abuse, and
where recognition of a secessionist entity would effectively
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sanction the parent state without making the world worse off, the
sanction theory will conflict with any alternative theories that
counsel non-recognition. Thus, the sanction theory requires that
these theories be rejected in such cases. By focusing primarily on
the secessionist entity and not on the parent state, these alternative
theories allow the parent state to violate human rights with
impunity, knowing that recognition of the secessionist movement
will not be granted, no matter how bad the parent state’s behavior.
Whether constructed with the declaratory or constitutive theory in
mind, these additional requirements blunt the effectiveness of
recognition as a sanction again human rights abuses, eliminating
one of the few tools that the international community has to deter
such behavior.
The most straightforward alternative theories are based on the
declaratory model’s notion that recognition should be granted if
and only if an entity meets the requirements of statehood.161 As
discussed above, the most frequently cited outlines for these
requirements are those put forth in the Montevideo Convention.162
If those requirements are adopted, along with the declaratory
model’s notion that states must recognize all entities that meet the
requirements for statehood, we are left with a theory that suggests
that all entities that meet the Montevideo Convention
requirements, and only such entities, should be granted
recognition.
While territory and population are clearly necessary for the
secessionist entity to even qualify as an “entity,” requiring more
than a potential government with some degree of effective control
ties the hands of the international community. If more is required
of the secessionist entity the parent state can continue its abuse,
knowing that the international community is prohibited from
granting recognition to the secessionist entity in an attempt to stop
the bad behavior. This view thus seems to ignore the reality of the
situation: that the international community has very few tools at
its disposal for deterring bad behavior. Given the importance of
deterring states from violating human rights, and given the
scarcity of deterrence methods, the international community
should not bind itself to recognizing only states in complete
161 See GRANT, supra note 12, at 4 (“When the attributes which international
law holds to define a state come to obtain within a community, existing states
should declare that fact by according the community recognition.”).
162 Montevideo Convention, supra note 3.
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“effective control.” Instead, all that should be necessary is that the
secessionist entity be capable of potentially controlling its territory
after recognition is granted, and not be the type of entity whose
recognition will lead to negative consequences greater than the
positive consequences brought about by the sanction effects of
recognition.
From a practical perspective, requiring effective control not
only allows abusive parent states to continue their bad behavior in
certain situations, but it also creates strong incentives for all states
to prevent internal entities from possessing anything approaching
effective control. This would lead states to avoid, for instance, the
creation of autonomous units within themselves or the delegation
of authority to local administrations, which seems, on the whole, to
be a significantly negative consequence.163 The sanction theory, on
the other hand, would not change the incentives for such political
arrangements, but would cabin itself to providing incentives for
the parent state not to commit human rights abuses.
Other theories place additional requirements, beyond
statehood, on secessionist entities for the granting of recognition.
Because these alternatives make recognition, and even the threat of
recognition, unavailable in certain circumstances where the parent
state is committing human rights abuses, these theories impair the
efficacy of recognition as a potential sanction and should be
rejected. One theory, somewhat similar to the Montevideo
requirements, is the notion that only federal units should be
granted recognition.164 Seemingly drawing its strength from a
preference for maintaining territorial integrity165 (odd, given that
recognition of even a federal entity is disrupting the territorial
integrity of the parent state), this view that federal boundaries
should be maintained, seems, for a time, to have driven the nonrecognition of Kosovo as a state, as discussed above.166 In addition
to providing states with incentives to avoid federalization,167 this

163 See Allen Buchanan, Theories of Secession, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 43–44
(1997) (arguing against any theories of secession that dispose states to act in ways
that preclude potentially beneficial decentralization).
164 See GRANT, supra note 12, at 91 (noting that federal units generally have an
easier time securing self-determination, in the face of the territorial integrity
principles, than other pieces of the parent state).
165 Id.
166 See supra Section 3.3.
167 Buchanan, supra note 163, at 43–44.
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requirement dulls the power of recognition as a sanction and
suffers from a significant case of moral randomness.
Other requirements should be rejected for similar reasons.
Crawford has proposed, as a criterion for statehood, a requirement
that appears to be better stated as a condition for recognition: that
the new entity be independent in the sense that it was not formed
“under belligerent occupation,” is not under “substantial external
control,” and does not suffer from “[s]ubstantial illegality of
origin.”168 Secessionist entities are considered to be illegal in origin
under this theory if they arise:
outside of the accepted rules of international law,
particularly in regards to the use of force . . . in violation of
a colonial entity’s right to self-determination . . . without
the consent of the existing sovereign state . . . [or are] based
fundamentally on the denial of certain civil and political
rights to the large majority of its population . . . .169
In a similar vein, Sunstein and Amar have each proposed
restrictions on recognition based on a notion that secession must be
legal under the constitutional or local law of the parent state.170
While these restrictions may be worthwhile for crafting a
general theory of secession, they should be rejected in the context
of parent states that are committing human rights abuses. As with
other requirements, they reduce the effectiveness of recognition as
a sanction by making it unavailable in certain situations, leaving
the parent state’s behavior uncontrolled. Further, while many of
the norms behind these requirements may have strong pull in
other contexts, they lose much of their force when the parent state
is committing human rights abuses: the consent of the parent state
and respect for the constitutional or local law of the parent state
seem particularly inapposite, as does concern for the right to selfdetermination of a colonial entity that is engaging in serious
human rights abuses. At least some external control also seems
forgivable in the sense that the alternative is to leave the
secessionist entity under the control of an abusive state. The same
could be said for allowing the secessionist entity to have arisen

Grant, supra note 39, at 437.
PEGG, supra note 40, at 48.
170 See Grant, supra note 134, at 316 (attributing Sunstein and Amar’s
proposed requirement to the “special U.S. concern for the written constitution”).
168
169
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through some degree of violation of international law, given that
refusing to recognize the secessionist entity will leave it under the
control of a parent state with a proven record of violating
international law itself.
Others have argued that the right to secession and
independence, and presumably the right to recognition, hinges on
advancing “national self-determination.”171 Under these theories,
“political and cultural (or ethnic) boundaries must, as a matter of
right, coincide.”172 Regardless of the justification for such a theory
in other contexts, it should be rejected as an additional criterion for
recognition when utilized as a sanction. Such a requirement would
reduce the effectiveness of the sanction, and would insulate the
parent state from punitive recognition whenever the secessionist
entities within its borders were either nationally diverse or merely
an incomplete subset of a particular nationality within the parent
state. There are numerous existing states that are nationally
heterogeneous, or which contain only a fraction of a particular
nationality, and, in the face of the parent state’s bad behavior, there
is nothing inherently wrong with recognizing one more.
Finally, democracy has been proposed as a requirement for
the recognition of secessionist entities.173 While demanding
evidence that the people of the secessionist entity actually desire to
secede, as in the case of Bosnia,174 seems reasonable, demanding
“proof of democratic institutions” seems unwise.
Such a
requirement would disqualify secessionist entities from
recognition and thus allow the parent state to continue its bad
behavior with knowledge that, until the secessionist entity had
gone through the arduous task of developing democratic
institutions, the secessionist entity could not be recognized and
thus the parent state could not be sanctioned. Further, as with the
requirements of local autonomy and federalization, a requirement
of democracy could create incentives for parent states to avoid
democracy both generally and at a local level to prevent
171 See Margaret Moore, Introduction: The Self-Determination Principle and the
Ethics of Secession, in NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION 1, 7 (Margaret
Moore ed., 1998) (providing an overview of this theory).
172 Id. (internal quotation omitted).
173 See GRANT, supra note 12, at 94 (discussing how state practice has accreted
a criterion of democracy to the prerequisites of statehood).
174 See Lowe & Warbrick, supra note 103, at 434 (citing Bosnia as an example
where “there was inadequate evidence that the people were in favour of
independence”).
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secessionist entities from building the capability to develop their
own democratic institutions or transform the parent state’s
democratic institutions into their own.175 While democracy is an
excellent aspiration for the international community, in the context
of parent states that commit human rights abuses, demanding it of
secessionist entities seems to be a case of the best being the enemy
of the good.
Alternative theories may also require any number of factors in
addition to recognition. To the degree that they insulate a parent
state from the sanction of recognition by making it impossible for a
secessionist entity to be recognized, they should be resisted. One
instance of such a combination of requirements was the European
Community’s “Declaration on the Guidelines on Recognition of
new States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union,” discussed
above.176 As their name suggests, of course, the Guidelines were
not a general theory of recognition, but were crafted for a specific
situation and were inherently tied up with a particular region and
political situation. Furthermore, they required not only that the
secessionist entities be democratically constituted, but also that
they accept “the appropriate international obligations,” commit
themselves “to a peaceful process and to negotiations,”177 and meet
a number of additional criteria: demonstrate their “respect for the
provisions” of the U.N. Charter and other international law
documents;178 provide sufficient “guarantees for the rights of [ ]
ethnic and national groups and minorities;”179 “respect [ ] the
inviolability of all frontiers” and acknowledge that they could
“only be changed by peaceful means and by common
agreement;”180 commit to “disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation” as well as “security and regional stability;”181 and
express their willingness to “settle by agreement, including . . .
arbitration, all questions concerning State succession and regional
175 See Buchanan, supra note 163, at 43 (generally discouraging any
requirement that creates perverse incentives undermining morally sound
principles of international law).
176 See supra Section 3.2.
177 Lowe & Warbrick, supra note 38, at 477 (quoting the Declaration of
Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union).
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
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disputes.”182 In other pronouncements, the European Community
also made it clear that the states had to accept “provisions on
human rights suggested by the EC Conference on Yugoslavia and
the continued work of the Conference and . . . the work of the
Security Council in Yugoslavia,”183 and adopt “constitutional and
political guarantees ensuring that it has no territorial claim
towards a neighboring Community State, including the use of
language which implies territorial claims.”184
While this laundry list of requirements might appear quite
difficult to meet, in fact, most of the requirements required little
more than commitments and promises. The notion of conditioning
recognition on promises extracted from the secessionist entity
works perfectly well with the sanction theory to the extent that it is
clear to all parties involved that the promises can be extracted.
Given the desire of the secessionist entity to achieve recognition,
they will have incentives to make the promises and conform to
them, and the moment of recognition is an excellent time to extract
such promises for the good of the international community and for
the population of the secessionist entity.185 Further, as long as the
parent state knows that the only promises that will be demanded
of the secessionist entity are of the type that the secessionist entity
is already willing to make without delay, then conditioning
recognition on such promises will form no barrier to deterrence,
and can simply increase the utility gained from the recognition
decision by having it serve simultaneously as a deterrent and as a
mechanism to encourage the secessionist entity to make positive
commitments. As long as the secessionist entity can make the
promises easily, the parent state will know that such requirements
will not form an effective bar to recognition, and thus will not give
the parent state license to commit human rights abuses for fear of
recognition. Any promises that would effectively disqualify
secessionist entities from recognition, however, should be rejected,
as they will simply serve to allow the parent state to continue its
bad behavior. Additionally, while requiring commitments like
those laid out by the European Community is quite appealing,
promises are, after all, only promises.

182
183
184
185

Id.
Id. at 478.
Id.
BUCHANAN, supra note 3, at 170.
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These theories all have much to say for themselves; in
situations where the sanction theory does not apply, the
international community may wish to adopt one of these
alternatives, or some combination of them. But in situations where
the sanction theory recommends recognition, the international
community should reject their added requirements. The positive
effects for human rights brought about by using recognition as a
sanction are simply too weighty to be ignored.
4.

THE SANCTION THEORY IN USE

4.1. Introduction
In addition to providing a better way to think about
recognition and its benefits to the international community, recent
practice suggests that the sanction theory of recognition is
becoming one of the standard modalities for the enforcement of
human rights. While recent practice is not inconsistent with other
alternative theories, its consistency with the sanction theory
provides evidence that the impulses behind this theory have come
to influence the thinking of the international community. In
addition to the recognition of states in the former Yugoslavia,
discussed above, which appears to have come in response to the
central government’s mistreatment of its people,186 the recognition
decisions in the cases of Somaliland, Chechnya, and Kosovo all
lend support to this notion.
4.2. Somaliland
The Republic of Somaliland is a secessionist entity within the
borders of Somalia. During the colonial period, the Republic of
Somaliland was a British colony, while the rest of modern-day
Somalia constituted Somalia Italiana, an Italian colony.187 In June
of 1960, Somaliland gained its independence from Britain, and was
quickly recognized as a state by the United Nations.188 In July,
Somaliland united with the newly independent Somalia Italiana to

186 See supra Sections 3.2.–3.3. (examining the sanction theory via the
recognition of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia).
187 Alison K. Eggers, Note, When Is a State a State? The Case for Recognition of
Somaliland, 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 211, 212 (2007).
188 Id.
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form the modern-day Somalia.189 Prior to colonization, Somaliland
had a history “as a stable state,” something neither Somalia Italiana
nor Somalia as a whole could claim.190 Almost immediately after
unification, the people of Somaliland held a referendum in which
they voted strongly against unification and for independence, but
the referendum went unheeded.191
Unified, “[n]orthern grievances against southern domination
began appearing almost immediately . . . . [T]he south
monopolized all the key political posts . . . . The centralization of
government in Mogadishu [in the south] . . . meant that economic
and political opportunities also became concentrated there.
Additionally, the south provided the country’s flag, its
constitution, and its national anthem.”192 When Siad Barre came to
power in 1969, Somaliland’s fortunes “took a dramatic turn for the
worse.”193 Somaliland “suffered from extensive and systematic
human rights violations during Barre’s regime,”194 which lasted
until early 1991.195
In the eighteen years since Barre’s fall, Somalia has seen
nothing but fighting and failed governments;196 its government has
suffered a “complete collapse,”197 and it currently lacks any “sort of
governmental structure.”198 Somaliland, on the other hand, has
been “a comparative picture of stability and good governance.”199
As for its eligibility for recognition, Somaliland “easily meets the
criteria set forth by the Montevideo Convention,”200 including
possessing a government in effective control of its territory and
with the capacity to enter into foreign relations.201 Somaliland “has
Id.
Id.
191 Id.
192 PEGG, supra note 40, at 88.
193 Id.
194 MICHAEL SCHOISWOHL, STATUS AND (HUMAN RIGHTS) OBLIGATIONS OF NONRECOGNIZED DE FACTO REGIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CASE OF ‘SOMALILAND’
163 (2004).
195 PEGG, supra note 40, at 89–90.
196 SCHOISWOHL, supra note 194, at 105–10.
197 Robert D. Sloane, The Changing Face of Recognition in International Law: A
Case Study of Tibet, 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 107, 113 (2002).
198 SCHOISWOHL, supra note 194, at 110.
199 PEGG, supra note 40, at 90–91.
200 Eggers, supra note 187, at 217.
201 Id. at 217–19.
189
190
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suffered from a distinct lack of external assistance” and its
independence cannot be challenged.202 Somaliland’s government
has “broad popular support,” albeit with “some opposition,” and it
is structured in a democratic manner,203 under a constitution
adopted democratically.204 Furthermore, “the government has
undertaken considerable efforts to satisfy at least the minimum
international human rights standards.”205
Somaliland thus seems to meet most of the requirements
proposed by the theories of recognition that focus on the intrinsic
merits of the secessionist entity:
it meets the Montevideo
Convention criteria, it is independent, it is democratically
constituted, its boundaries were set in the past, and it has shown
respect for at least a base level of human rights. Moreover, the
parent state from which it is attempting to secede can barely be
called a state at all; more accurately, it is a power vacuum that
remains in the wake of a state’s complete collapse. Despite all this,
Somaliland has not been recognized as an independent state.206
“Just cause” and “just cause plus” theories of recognition also seem
to suggest that recognition should be granted: in addition to
Somaliland’s commitment to basic human rights standards, it
suffered decades of abuse at the hands of its parent state, followed
by fifteen years in which the supposed parent state has fulfilled
none of the requirements of a parent state.207
Somaliland’s non-recognition, however, is completely
consistent with the sanction theory of recognition. The sanction
theory recommends recognition when it would serve as an
effective sanction for the bad behavior of a secessionist entity’s
parent state. But it is difficult, given Somalia’s complete collapse,
even to talk about Somalia as a state at all; given its situation, it is
certainly not the type of entity that can be sanctioned. Somalia is
incapable of doing anything, let alone being deterred (or punished,
for that matter). Furthermore, sanctioning Somalia would have no
general deterrent effect, as states in similar situations are just as
PEGG, supra note 40, at 96–97.
Id. at 94.
204 SCHOISWOHL, supra note 194, at 133–35.
205 Id. at 136.
206 PEGG, supra note 40, at 91.
207 But see, SCHOISWOHL, supra note 194, at 163–64 (arguing that Somaliland no
longer has a just cause to secede because the government that abused Somaliland
is no longer in power).
202
203
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inherently impossible to sanction. The international community’s
non-recognition of Somaliland is completely consistent with the
sanction theory of recognition because recognizing Somaliland
would not serve as an effective sanction.
4.3. Chechnya
The history of the relationship between Russia and Chechnya
for the past 200 years is ugly, with violence rampant through
Russia’s attempts first to colonize Chechnya, then to consolidate its
control through various methods.208 Russia’s most horrendous
behavior occurred under Stalin’s rule, when the entire population
of Chechnya—over 400,000 Chechens—was forcibly removed by
the Russian military.209 In addition to those killed for resisting or
for being too “logistically complicated” to move, tens of thousands
died during the “resettlement” process and over 100,000 died after
being relocated.210 After Stalin’s death, the Chechens returned, and
while tensions ran high between the Chechens and the Russians
that had replaced them, they managed an “uneasy . . . coexistence.”211
As the Soviet Union was crumbling, Dzhokhar Dudaev was
democratically elected President of Chechnya.
Upon his
inauguration in November 1991, he declared Chechnya
independent.212 While the Russian military briefly attempted to
remove Dudaev from power, they failed to do so, and Russian
troops vacated Chechnya.213 From then until 1994, Chechnya had
“de facto” independence.214 In December of 1994, Russia attacked,
leading to a twenty-month war with over 45,000 killed.215 Twentyseven thousand civilians were killed in Russian attacks on Grozny
alone.216 Much of the Russian military action in Chechnya appears

208 See generally TONY WOOD, CHECHNYA: THE CASE FOR INDEPENDENCE 19–39
(2007) (outlining tragic historical events that confronted Chechens from the
sixteenth century to the nineteenth with emphasis on Russian invasions).
209 Id. at 36–38.
210 Id. at 37–38.
211 Id. at 43.
212 Id. at 51.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 59.
216 Id. at 71.
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to have been indiscriminate or specifically targeted at civilians.217
Dudaev himself was far from a model leader,218 and the Chechens’
conduct in the war was far from exemplary.219 Nevertheless, the
Chechens eventually defeated the Russians, and as of 1996,
Chechnya was once again de facto independent.220
This
independence was far from perfect, with widespread violence and
corruption, but it lasted in full for three years, until 1999.221 Russia
eventually invaded again, this time successfully taking power, but
not without bombing marketplaces and lines of fleeing refugees,
holding civilians in detention camps for torture and execution, and
targeting civilians for various “barbaric acts.”222
At no point during Chechnya’s various moments of de facto
independence did another state recognize it as an independent
state, with the exception of Afghanistan’s Taliban government.223
Its de facto independence from 1991–1994, and to a lesser extent, its
second de facto independence from 1996–1999, would seem to
justify recognition under a Montevideo Convention-based theory
of recognition.224 Recognizing Chechnya would also seem to be
consistent with the goal of advancing self-determination. And
while the behavior of the Chechens in the war against Russia might
disqualify it from recognition under a “just cause plus” theory of
recognition, Russia’s indisputably worse behavior undoubtedly
justified recognition under a simple “just cause” theory of
recognition.
The international community’s non-recognition of Chechnya,
however, is completely consistent with the sanction theory of
recognition. The sanction theory only requires recognition when
doing so would serve as an effective sanction for the bad behavior
of the parent state, and where recognition would not make the
world worse off. Recognizing Chechnya, however, fails for two
reasons: it would not serve as an effective sanction, and it might
Id. at 71–72.
See id. at 60–66 (detailing problems with Dudaev’s leadership, particularly
economic policy failures).
219 See, e.g., id. at 72–73 (describing a Chechen raid on a Russian hospital).
220 Id. at 75.
221 Id. at 81–94.
222 Id. at 97–121.
223 Thomas D. Grant, Current Development: Afghanistan Recognizes Chechnya, 15
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 869, 869–71 (2000).
224 GRANT, supra note 12, at 29.
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make the world worse off. As for serving as an effective sanction,
recognition can only be effective if the new state, once recognized,
can remain independent of the parent state. If the parent state can
simply overrun the new state and reincorporate it into its own
territory, then the recognition will have been in vain. Given
Russia’s success in regaining control of Chechnya following its
second de facto independence, it seems unlikely that recognition,
without foreign military aid, could have stopped Russia. Similarly,
given Russia’s aggressiveness and military power, it is unclear that
even a significant foreign military presence in a newly recognized
Chechnya could have kept it independent of Russia, and thereby
made recognition an effective sanction.
Furthermore, even if a large foreign military presence could
have stopped Russia from quashing Chechnya’s independence, the
likely result would have violated the requirement that the
recognition decision not make the world worse off. Not only
would the recognition have raised the already high tensions
between the West and Russia, a nuclear superpower, but it also
would have likely led to significant and ongoing conflict between
Russia and the foreign military presence that would be necessary
to secure Chechnya’s independence. Given these enormous
consequences, and Chechnya’s own bad behavior, it seems
unlikely that the possible deterrent effect achieved by recognition
of Chechnya would be justified: it would likely make the world
worse off.
Thus, despite Russia’s bad behavior, the sanction theory of
recognition would not have recommended recognition for
Chechnya at any point. Given Russia’s aggressiveness and
military might, recognition of Chechnya would likely not have
secured its independence, thereby negating the deterrent effect of
recognition, as well as the subsidiary goal of incapacitating the
parent state with regards to the secessionist entity. Further, given
the bloody conflict that would have likely ensued had the
international community provided the requisite military support to
keep Chechnya independent, and thus made recognition an
effective deterrent, the negative consequences of recognizing
Chechnya would likely have outweighed the positive sanction
effects of recognizing Chechnya. Therefore, the recognition
decision would have made the world worse off. As Russia remains
aggressive and militarily powerful, it is unlikely that the sanction
theory would ever recommend recognition of Chechnya, or any
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secessionist entity within Russia’s borders, regardless of Russia’s
bad behavior throughout its territory.225
4.4. Kosovo
For centuries, there has been conflict between the Kosovar
Albanians and the Serbs, with the Serbs claiming that Kosovo is
part of Serbia, and the Kosovar Albanians claiming a status as an
independent nation.226 Nevertheless, the Kosovar Albanians were
unable to gain recognition as an independent nation throughout
the 20th century, and Kosovo was considered part of Yugoslavia.227
When communist Yugoslavia was established in the wake of
World War II, the Kosovar Albanians “were granted a degree of
autonomy within Serbia.”228 Eventually, under Yugoslavia’s 1974
constitution, Kosovo was granted “significant autonomy.
Although it was technically still within Serbia, in reality the region
was granted a status similar to that of the constituent republics of
the federation.”229
The Kosovar Albanians, however, desired the status of an
actual republic, but their demands were met with violence and
repression.230
Eventually, in 1989, Kosovo’s autonomy was
extinguished, and its people were “exposed to massive abuse of
their human rights and civil liberties.”231 After watching other
secessionist entities within Yugoslavia gain recognition as states
while its own requests for recognition went unheeded,232 in 1998,
Kosovo turned to the Kosovo Liberation Army and guerilla
225 Almost identical statements could be made about the international
community’s continuing non-recognition of Tibet and Taiwan. While China has
committed human rights abuses throughout its territory, and many theories of
recognition would impel the acknowledgment of Tibet and Taiwan as new states,
the sanction theory would not counsel recognition. Given China’s aggressiveness
and military might, recognition would not serve as an effective sanction, and
would likely make the world worse off.
226 Agon Demjaha, The Kosovo conflict: A perspective from inside, in KOSOVO AND
THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 32, 32–33 (Albrecht Schnabel &
Ramesh Thakur eds., 2000).
227 Id. at 33.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 See Detrez, supra note 142, at 123–25 (examining the international
community’s inconsistent approach “in addressing the question of national selfdetermination” with respect to national communities in Yugoslavia).
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warfare to attain independence.233 Serbia responded with ethnic
cleansing,234 forcibly deporting over 800,000 Kosovar Albanians,
murdering over 10,000, and raping many more.235 As a result of
large-scale NATO air strikes and the threat of a ground invasion,
Serbia eventually agreed to withdraw its troops from Kosovo and
allow the U.N. to establish a “protectorate” there.236 Since that
time, over 16,000 troops have attempted to keep the peace in
Kosovo,237 although they have not been completely successful in
stopping Kosovar Albanian reprisals against Serb civilians.238
Kosovo was not immediately granted recognition in the wake
of Serbia’s withdrawal. Nevertheless, the Kosovar Albanians
perceived that “NATO’s humanitarian intervention and the
establishment of Kosovo as an international trusteeship in
everything but name appeared to set the track for an inevitable
move to independence.”239 After years of deadlock and dodging
the question, the U.N. proposed a plan for an independent
Kosovo.240
On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared its
independence,241 and while Serbia and many other states continue
to contest its independence, by March 19, 2008, over 30 countries
had recognized it as a new state.242
Understanding the U.N. trusteeship as a long path towards
recognition, Kosovo would likely have gone unrecognized under a
Montevideo Convention-based theory of recognition: without the
Demjaha, supra note 226, at 34.
Id. at 34–37.
235 Arne Johan Vetlesen, The logic of genocide and the prospects of reconciliation,
in KOSOVO BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE 37, 43 (Tonny Brems Knudsen & Carsten
Bagge Lausten eds., 2006).
236 Demjaha, supra note 226, at 35–39.
237 See Thomas Omestad, Kosovo Deadline Passes, Making Independence Likely,
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Dec. 10, 2007, available at http://www.usnews.com/
articles/news/2007/12/10/kosovo-deadline-passes-making-independence-likely
.html.
238 Demjaha, supra note 226, at 37.
239 Tonny Brems Knudsen, From UNMIK to self-determination? The puzzle of
Kosovo’s future status, in KOSOVO BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE, supra note 235, at 156,
160.
240 Omestad, supra note 237.
241 Associated Press, Kosovo Declares Independence, MSNBC, Feb. 18, 2008,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23203607/.
242 Douglas Hamilton, Neighbors’ Kosovo Recognition Deals Blow to Serbia,
REUTERS, Mar. 19, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews
/idUSL172863120080319.
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support of NATO and the U.N., Kosovo was unable to protect its
people from Serbia’s military, and thus could not be said to have
had a government that was in effective control of its territory. On
the other hand, Kosovo’s recognition is in line with “just cause”
theories of recognition,243 although its violent origins and
subsequent misbehavior toward Serb civilians might undermine its
claim to recognition under a “just cause plus” theory of
recognition.
The sanction theory of recognition, however, would certainly
recommend recognition of Kosovo. In light of the international
community’s earlier recognitions of Bosnia, Macedonia, Slovenia,
and Croatia, opposed by Serbia and discussed above,244 the
international community was fully cognizant of its ability to
effectively sanction Serbia through recognition; it was fully capable
of effectively guaranteeing the independence of newly recognized
states in the face of Serbian opposition. Further, Serbia’s atrocious
human rights abuses were exactly the type of behavior that the
sanction theory of recognition is designed to deter.
The recognition of Kosovo can be understood as a sanction for
Serbia’s bad behavior not only in Kosovo, but also for Serbia’s
earlier bad behavior in Bosnia and Croatia. Recognizing Kosovo
can also be understood as a sanction not only for bad behavior qua
bad behavior, but also as a sanction for bad behavior insofar as it
represented a willful refusal to reform. Under the sanction theory,
the international community’s recognition of Bosnia, Croatia,
Slovenia, and Macedonia was a signal for Serbia to reform its bad
behavior. In ignoring this signal by engaging in further human
rights abuses in Kosovo, Serbia’s bad behavior amounted to
flouting the international community’s demand that it reform its
behavior and threatened to undermine the general deterrent power
of the sanction theory of recognition. Thus, the recognition of
Kosovo is consistent not only with the sanction theory of
recognition generally, but also with a desire to protect the efficacy
of the sanction theory as a tool for combating human rights abuses.

Detrez, supra note 142, at 132.
See supra Section 3.2.–3.3. (examining the sanction theory of recognition
and the principle of territorial integrity via the recognition of Slovenia, Croatia,
Bosnia, and Macedonia).
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5. CONCLUSION
The cases of Somaliland, Chechnya, Kosovo, and the other
secessionist entities discussed throughout this Article are not
intended to prove that the sanction theory of recognition has been
expressly adopted by the international community. Instead, they
simply show that the international community has behaved in
ways that are quite consistent with the sanction theory of
recognition in many cases, and that many of the considerations
driving the sanction theory of recognition appear to be driving the
actual recognition decisions made by the international community.
In addition to these cases, international practice and international
law appear to be generally compatible with the adoption of the
sanction theory of recognition with only minor modification.
Given this consistency with law and practice, the sanction
theory of recognition should be adopted by the international
community. In those cases where a parent state has committed
human rights abuses, and recognition of a secessionist entity
would serve as an effective sanction without making the world
worse off, intrinsic considerations should be put aside and
recognition should be granted. The international community is
justified in harming the interests of the parent state and violating
its territorial integrity in such cases because the parent state has
violated its essential obligations as a state and thus forfeited its
right to object. More fundamentally, the international community
is justified in adopting the sanction theory of recognition because
its returns are so great. The international community has very few
tools at its disposal for enforcing good human rights behavior on
the part of states. The sanction theory, by shifting the focus of
recognition decisions from the intrinsic merits of the secessionist
entity to the bad behavior of the parent state, while rejecting any
requirement of a nexus between the bad behavior and the
secessionist entity, maximizes the benefits that can be achieved
through recognition, and transforms recognition into a powerful
tool to combat human rights abuses.
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